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New Results of Related-key Attacks on All Py-Family of Stream Ciphers
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نویسنده
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Ding Lin ,Guan Jie ,Sun Wen-long
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منبع
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journal of universal computer science - 2012 - دوره : 18 - شماره : 12 - صفحه:1741 -1756
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چکیده
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The stream cipher tpypy has been designed by biham and seberry in january 2007 as the strongest member of the py-family of stream ciphers. at indocrypt 2007, sekar, paul and preneel showed related-key weaknesses in the py-family of stream ciphers including the strongest member tpypy. furthermore, they modified the stream ciphers tpypy and tpy to generate two fast ciphers, namely rcr-32 and rcr-64, in an attempt to rule out all the attacks against the py-family of stream ciphers. so far there exists no attack on rcr-32 and rcr-64.in this paper, we show that the related-key weaknesses can be still used to construct related-key distinguishing attacks on all py-family of stream ciphers including the modified versions rcr- 32 and rcr-64. under related keys, we show distinguishing attacks on rcr-32 and rcr-64 with data complexity 2139.3 and advantage greater than 0.5. we also show that the data complexity of the distinguishing attacks on py-family of stream ciphers proposed by sekar et al. can be reduced from 2193.7 to 2149.3 . these results constitute the best attacks on the strongest members of the py-family of stream ciphers tpypy, rcr-32 and rcr-64. by modifying the key setup algorithm, we propose two new stream ciphers trcr-32 and trcr-64 which are derived from rcr-32 and rcr-64 respectively. based on our security analysis, we conjecture that no attacks lower than brute force are possible on trcr-32 and trcr-64 stream ciphers.
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کلیدواژه
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Cryptanalysis ,Related-key Attack ,Distinguishing Attack ,Py-family of Stream Ciphers ,TRCR-32 ,TRCR-64
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آدرس
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Information Science and Technology Institute, China, Information Science and Technology Institute, China, Information Science and Technology Institute, China
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پست الکترونیکی
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swl881010@126.com
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Authors
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