Hubungan Polisi Hutang, Pemilikan Dalaman dan Polisi Dividen sebagai Mekanisme Pengawasan Masalah Agensi di Malaysia

This study investigates the substitution relationship (substitutability) among debt policy, insider ownership, and dividend policy as the agency problem control mechanism in malaysia. if the substitution relationship exists among the agency control mechanisms, the agency problem can be reduced through this relationship. reducing the agency problem as a result can increase the firm value proxied by tobin's q. this study also examines the substitutability among debt policy, insider ownership, and dividend policy when the extreme agency problem is considered. the extreme level of agency problem is measured based on the high level of short term debt, the low level of insider ownership and the low level of dividend payment rate. this study employs 396 firms sample listed on malaysian bourse from 2001 to 2004. to achieve the objectives , this study uses two-stage least square method. the results of this study indicate that the substitutability among debt policy, insider ownership, and dividend policy as agency problem control mechanism does not fully exist in malaysia. apparently the substitutability only exists for debt policy and dividend. there is no substitution between debt policy and insider ownership as well as between dividend policy and insider ownership in addition, if the level of agency problem is considered, the substitutability only occurs between debt policy and dividend policy. this result is consistent with the analysis in which the extreme level of agency problems was not considered.