تشدید تنش در قره‌باغ و چالش منافع منطقه‌ای ایران در سال‌های 2020 و 2023

جنگ قره‌باغ در سال 2020 و تحول‌های بعد از آن به‌ویژه خروج ارامنه از قره‌باغ، مسیر بدون بازگشتی را برای منطقۀ قفقاز ‌جنوبی ترسیم کرد. به‌طوری‌ که این تحول‌ها تاثیر چشمگیری بر بازیگران جنوب قفقاز بر جای گذاشت. پرسش اصلی نوشتار این است که جنگ دوم و سوم قره‌باغ چگونه بر منافع منطقه‌ای جمهوری اسلامی ایران تاثیر گذاشته است؟ در پاسخ این فرضیه مطرح می‌شود که براساس جنگ قره‌باغ در سال‌های 2020 و 2023 پویایی رقابت، تهدید و افزایش تنش بر ایران افزایش یافته است؛ در‌حالی که پیدایی فرصت‌های احتمالی برای ایران چندان آشکار نیست. در این نوشتار از روش پژوهش قیاسی استفاده می‌کنیم که با کاربرد مدل تحلیلی و رویکرد ژئوپلیتیک در چارچوب مطالعات منطقه‌ای و در زیر واقع‌گرایی است. تحلیل داده‌ها به‌صورت توصیفی‌تحلیلی و گردآوری اطلاعات ‌با ‌استفاده ‌از منابع کتابخانه‌ای ‌انجام‌ شده است‌. یافته‌های این نوشتار نشان می‌دهد موازنۀ قدرت جدید و روابط ژئوپلیتیکی شکل گرفته در منطقۀ‌ قفقاز جنوبی با به‌چالش کشیده‌شدن قدرت روسیه توسط محور جمهوری آذربایجان، ترکیه و اسرائیل، به‌حاشیه رفتن محور غرب، پر‌رنگ‌شدن نقش ترکیه و کم‌رنگ‌شدن نقش ایران تغییر کرده است. همچنین ایران در دوره‌هایی از زمان پس از این جنگ‌ها از نظر ژئوپلیتیک و مولفه‌های اقتصادی و فرهنگی آن، ژئواکونومیک و ژئوکالچر، با تشدید رقابت و تهدید با ترکیه و اسرائیل و همچنین افزایش تنش با جمهوری آذربایجان روبه ‌رو شد که در قالب راه‌گذر احتمالی زنگزور، ‌طرح یک کمربند و یک راه، راه‌گذر شمال‌جنوب، پررنگ‌شدن تهدیدها بر مبنای پان‌ترک‌گرایی/پان‌آذری‌گرایی و حضور اسرائیل در مناطق آزاد‌شدۀ قره‌باغ، نزدیک مرزهای ایران جریان دارد.

the escalation of tension in nagorno-karabakh and the challenge of iran’s regional interests: 2020-2023

introduction: the international system in transition and the uncertainty in it, has caused the dynamism of most regions in the world. the south caucasus region is not exempt from this situation. the 2020 nagorno-karabakh war and its subsequent develpements, especially the 2023 karabakh war, marked a path of no return for the south caucasus region, so these developments had a significant impact on the actors of the south caucasus.research question: what effect did the second and third karabakh war in the south caucasus region between armenia and azerbaijan have on the regional interests of the islamic republic of iran?research hypothesis: it is hypothesized that nagorno-karabakh war in 2020 and 2023 respectively, has increased the dynamics of competition, threat and escalation of tension against iran, while there are not many opportunities for it.methodology: in this article, a comparative research approach has been used, which is realistic using a study model and the geopolitical approach in the framework of regional studies. using geopolitical components such as politics, power, geography, economy (geoeconomics), culture (geoculture), geopolitical relations and balance of power. data analysis is done in a descriptive-analytical way. the method of collecting information in this research is done by the library method.results and discussion: since the early 2000s, russia’s policy towards the nagorno-karabakh crisis has changed. therefore, russia’s attitude toward the south caucasus has changed from a sphere of exclusive russian influence to a space in which it must both cooperate and compete with other regional powers. moscow prefers to cooperate with iran and mostly turkey to respond to the growing challenges. in this situation and due to the fact that azerbaijan is close to russia and armenia is far from russia, the second karabakh war started. but the third karabakh war took place in a situation where russia’s power vacuum was evident in the south caucasus after moscow’s involvement in the ukraine war. the karabakh war of 2020 and 2023 in the national dimension between azerbaijan and armenia caused the position of the victorious and defeated actors of the first karabakh war to be reversed. in the regional dimension, new geopolitical relations and balance of power emerged in the south caucasus.conclusion: the findings of the research proved the hypothesis raised in the article. the 2020 and 2023 karabakh war once again showed the geopolitical dynamics of the south caucasus. these wars have significantly changed the geopolitical relations of regional players and led to the formation of a new balance of power in the region. azerbaijan has strengthened and armenia has become very weak. however, with the cease-fire of the second karabakh war, russia was able to marginalize the western axis, which further weakened the role of the west, the united states, the european union and especially the organization for security and cooperation in europe (minsk group). but by entering the war with ukraine and creating a power vacuum in the south caucasus region, russia saw its power in this region challenged by turkey. in this way, the second and third karabakh war marked turkey’s return to the region and pushed iran to the sidelines of regional developments.therefore, the 2020 and 2023 karabakh war destroyed the fragile state of neither war nor peace that iran was in favor of maintaining in the south caucasus. in these wars, iran could not play a role in regional developments to expand its influence and presence; therefore, it led to the escalation of tension with the republic of azerbaijan, the intensification of competition with turkey, and the seriousness of the threat of israel’s presence along iran’s borders. in the new balance of power that has been formed in the south caucasus region, the islamic republic of iran has a low role and position in the south caucasus. it seems that iran has been marginalized by russia on the one hand, on the other hand, due to the role of western sanctions in preventing iran’s action in the region; iran has not been able to play a serious role and pursue its historical-civilizational interests in the south caucasus. therefore, the islamic republic of iran has tried to maintain its territorial integrity, prevent geopolitical changes in the region and its geo-economic interests in the south caucasus. it has also tried not to get involved in ethnic movements and internal instability based on geocultural provocations.