ماهیت تجدیدنظرطلبی روسیه و چین؛ سیاست و منافع ایران

هدف در این نوشتار بررسی ماهیت تجدیدنظرطلبی روسیه و چین و تامل در مورد منافع و رویکرد بایستۀ ایران در این زمینه است. در دیالکتیک تشدیدشدۀ موضوعی و کارگزارانه در شرایط گذار به نظم جدید، تجدیدنظرطلبی این دو کشور بیش از گذشته برجسته شده است و پیامدهای ملموسی بر سیاست بین‌الملل و منافع ایران دارد. در این نوشتار با رویکردی نظام‌مند و در چارچوب مفهومی تجدیدنظرطلبی میانگیر ماهیت تغییرخواهی روسیه و چین را تحلیل می‌کنیم. این دو کشور تا یک دهه پیش به‌دلیل دسترسی اندک به منابع «خارج ‌نظام» در ردیف تجدیدنظرطلبان همگرا بودند که مترتب بر تغییرطلبی در چارچوب نظم ‌موجود، بدون چالشگری جدی است. در سال‌های اخیر با تقویت منابع خارج ‌نظام، تجدیدنظرطلبی آن‌ها به نوع میانگیر متمایل شده است که در آن تمایل و امکان تغییرها افزایش و هزینۀ تغییرطلبی کاهش می‌یابد. بنابر یافته‌های این نوشتار، نظر به اینکه همچنان بخش عمده‌ای از منابع این دو از «درون‌ نظام» تامین می‌شود، ماهیت تجدیدنظرطلبی آن‌ها نه معطوف به اساس نظم‌ موجود، بلکه اصلاح‌بخشی، تدریجی و غیراساسی برخی روندها و تمرکز بر نفی نسبی نیروی مسلط بر نظم‌ موجود یعنی آمریکا و غرب از بعضی روندها و ساخت‌ها است. با توجه به وجود وابستگی و آسیب‌پذیری‌ متقابل و اینکه آمریکا و غرب بیشتر توان شبکه‌ای و نهادی خود را تا آیندۀ پیش‌بینی‌پذیر حفظ خواهند کرد، تغییرخواهی نسبت به آمریکا و غرب نیز تدریجی، غیراساسی و عملگرایانه است. بر  ‌این ‌اساس، منافع و رویکرد ایران در فهم واقع‌گرایانۀ این مسئله است و تجدیدنظرطلبی تهران با روسیه و چین مشابه نبوده است و فرض امکان دریافت حمایت پایدار از آن‌ها به این دلیل، دقیق نیست.

The Nature of Russian and Chinese Revisionism; Iran’s Policy and Interests

The main purpose of this article is to examine the nature of Russian and Chinese revisionism and Iran’s approach to this issue. In the context of transition to a new international order, their revisionism has become more prominent than before, and this has tangible consequences for world politics and Iran. This paper analyzes the issue with a systematic approach and considering the interrelationship of agencies and thematic categories in the international arena and in the context of bridging revisionism. Until a decade ago, Moscow and Beijing were integrated revisionists because of their limited access to resources “outside the order”, arranging them for change within the existing order. In recent years, with strengthening these resources, their revisionism has shifted to bridging one, according to which the desire and possibility of change increases and the cost of change decreases. According to research findings, given that most of the resources of these two are still provided “from within the order”, their revisionism is not directed to the basis of existing order, but on gradual and nonradical modification of some processes. Their greater focus is on the relative negation of the dominant force in the existing order, the United States, certain processes and structures. This revisionism is also nonradical and pragmatic, as the US maintains its most institutional strength for the foreseeable future, and interdependencies intensify. Accordingly, some speculations in Iran about the possibility of receiving continued support from Russia and China, because of the similarity of Iran’s revisionist approach to them, are inaccurate.Introduction: The Main purpose of this article is to examine the nature of Russian and Chinese revisionism and Iran’s approach to this issue. In the context of transition to a new international order, their revisionism has become more prominent than before and this has had tangible consequences for the world politics and Iran. This paper analyzes the issue with a systematic approach and considering the interrelationship of agencies and thematic categories in the international arena and in the context of bridging revisionism. Until a decade ago, Moscow and Beijing were “integrated revisionists” because of their limited access to resources “outside the existing order”, arranging them for change within the existing order. In recent years, with strengthening these resources, their revisionism has shifted to “bridging one”, according to which the desire and possibility of change increases and the cost of change decreases.Research Question: The question of this article is what are characteristics of Russia and China’s revisionism and what is Iran’s approach in this regard. Iran, due to the special conditions of its foreign policy and its regional and international situation, is affected by the relations of the great powers, especially between Russia, China and the United States. This effect has been exacerbated in the context of Biden’s emphasis on “smart pressure” and the continuation of “maximum pressure”, especially as Tehran insists on active deterrence, including through the development of relations with Russia and China.In this regard, Iran, especially following the military cooperation in Syria, has deepened its relations with Moscow and is seeking a longterm strategic agreement with it. On the other hand, the 25year strategic agreement with China is a clear indication of Tehran’s determination to expand relations with China. The acceptance of Iran as a permanent member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is also a sign of efforts for multifaceted interaction with Moscow and Beijing. These developments increase the complexity of Iran’s relations with the great powers and also increase Tehran’s sensitivity to the state of RussiaChina relations with the international and US order.The Methodology and Theoretical Framework: This paper analyzes Russian and Chinese revisionism with a systematic approach and within the framework of &bridging revisionism& concept, referring to Stacie E. Goddard’s notion on four types of revisionists; integrated, bridging, isolated and rogue.Results and discussion: According to research findings, given that most of Russia and China’s resources are still provided “from within the order”, their revisionism is not directed to the basis of existing order, but on gradual and nonradical modification of some elements and trends. Their focus is on the relative negation of the dominant force in the existing order, the US, of some processes and structures. This revisionism is also nonradical and pragmatic, as the United States retains most of its institutional power for the foreseeable future, and as a result, interdependencies intensify.So the reason is that, firstly, Russia and China are in a state of complex interdependence and mutual vulnerability with the existing order and the powers that dominate it, so fundamental changes in the order will damage Moscow and Beijing (in particular), and secondly, they acknowledge that despite some weaknesses, the United States has retained much of its network and institutional strength, so a radical confrontation with it would be detrimental. Accordingly, Russia has a strategic agreement with Washington on strategic stability and security, and China on international economic stability, which keeps them away from a radical confrontation.On the other hand, due to the interconnectedness of the order and its dominant powers with China and Russia, it is not possible to radically limit them and apply unaccounted systemic pressures on them. Applying these pressures can be costly by creating a strategic challenge for the order and dominant powers. The fact that the policies of China and to a lesser extent, Russia are not illegitimate and unacceptable and have the potential to unite and use “out of order” resources, makes it difficult to put radical pressure on them.Accordingly, the existing order and the dominant forces, especially the United States, are involved in inciting the revisionism of Russia and China and its depth and scope. For example, by imposing and forcing the two to obey laws that are of interest to the West, they lead them to revisionism. Therefore, if, on the one hand, this approach and, on the other, the efforts of Russia and China for greater participation in world politics continue, their revisionism will become more aggressive and complex.Conclusion: As noted, Russian and Chinese revisionism and their confrontation with the US is not radical. Therefore, the assumption that Iranian revisionism is similar to Russia and China, and that this similarity is a precondition for longterm relations and continued support for Moscow and Beijing, is incorrect. Consequently, propositions such as “IranRussiaChina alliance” or “IranRussia strategic cooperation” are also inaccurate. Contrary to these assumptions, Moscow and Beijing’s revisionism are not focused against existing order or to remove the United States from international politics. They do not have the ability to achieve this goal, if any. They take advantage of current trends in the existing order, so the stability of the order is important to them. For this reason, they are cautious in dealing with antiorder/antiUS forces, including Iran, and do not want their relations with Tehran to disrupt their “intrasystem” interactions.