روسیه و ابتکار یک کمربند و یک راه چین؛ فرصت‌ها و تهدیدها

چین در سال 2013 طرح راه ابریشم نوین را در قالب ابتکار یک کمربند و یک راه مطرح کرد. این طرح چین می‌تواند سبب افزایش حوزۀ نفوذ چین از نظر اقتصادی و سیاسی بر دیگر مناطق شود. در واقع چین با ارائۀ این طرح و تکمیل‌ آن در بلندمدت خواستار تبدیل‌شدن از یک بازیگر مهم به یک بازیگر دارای قدرت رهبری جهانی است. در این طرح، کشورهای «خارج نزدیک»، به‌ویژه آسیای مرکزی نقش مهمی خواهند داشت. روسیه در آغاز با بدبینی به این اقدام چین نگریست و آن را گامی دیگر از سوی چین برای گسترش نفوذ در حیاط‌خلوت روسیه برداشت کرد، اما سپس وارد این طرح و یکی از پشتیبانان آن شد. در این نوشتار در پی پاسخ به این پرسش هستیم که با وجود بدبینی‌های اولیۀ روسیه، علت ورود روسیه به ابتکار کمربند و راه چین چیست؟ در پاسخ این فرضیه را مطرح می‌کنیم که به‌دنبال فشارها و تحریم‌های غرب علیه روسیه پس از بحران اوکراین و پدیدآمدن مشکلات اقتصادی و انزوای سیاسی، روسیه تصمیم گرفت با مشارکت در طرح نوین چین، از تنگنای اقتصادی و سیاسی خود بکاهد. روسیه همچنین طرح اتحادیۀ اقتصادی اوراسیا را در راستای طرح چین تعریف کرده است و می‌کوشد با همکاری در این طرح، از مزیت‌های آن بهره‌برداری کند. در این نوشتار روش پژوهش ما کمی و شیوۀ گردآوری اطلاعات بر پایۀ منابع کتابخانه‌ای و منابع معتبر اینترنتی است. متغیر اصلی موازنۀ قوای نرم روسیه و متغیر وابسته، همکاری روسیه با چین در طرح یک کمربند یک جاده است.

Russia and China’s New Silk Road Plan; Opportunities and Challenges

In 2013, China launched the New Silk Road plan as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In this plan, “the near abroad” states, especially Central Asians, will have an important contribution. Russia was initially reluctant and pessimistic regarding China’s move, taking it as another step by China to expand its economic and political influence in Russia’s sphere of influence and its backyard, but then joined the plan and was turned into one of its backers. In recent years, China has gained widespread influence and presence in countries that have been separated from the Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia. China’s current total exports to five Central Asian countries are higher than Russia’s level of exchange. China’s entry into the postSoviet region as a powerful player adds a new layer of complexity to Moscow’s efforts to manage interactions with members of the Eurasian Economic Union, particularly Belarus and Kazakhstan. But Russia’s main concern seems to be the interference of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative with the Eurasian Economic Union. Another reason why Russia is skeptical about China’s plan is that Russia has extensive plans in the field of regionalism with the seceded countries from the Soviet Union in the political, economic, and security realms. This makes Russia look at the zerosum game approach with any similar plan put forward by the great powers in the realm of coindependent states. Another Russian concern is the geopolitical implications of China’s plan. In connection with the Belt and Road Initiative, China, as a general practice in foreign policy, has sought to avoid the geopolitical literature and present its plan in the context of soft policy and economic and cultural cooperation. The plan of onebelt oneroad is a Chineseoriented plan. This plan is comparable to the US Marshall Plan after World War II. Although China insists on calling this a winwin plan, other analyses could turn it into a winlose for Russia in the long run. The issue that worries Russia is that China’s plan is not as normal as its bilateral relations vis –a–vis Russia. When China gain access and dominates the infrastructure and financial sectors of the postSoviet sphere of influence, including energy links, banking, insurance, mining, etc., it will have practically dominated all these countries, leaving no room for Russian activism. As such, the Silk Road Economic Belt is more than a crossroad and will provide a platform for China to increase its political influence in the heart of Eurasia. The main point that considers the plan of Chinese onebelt oneroad a longterm threat to Russia is that China is investing billions of dollars in neighboring countries within the framework of detailed and multidimensional contracts. Regardless of the economic and commercial dimensions of these contracts, which could leave less room for Russia, the issue is the security of large infrastructure investments. In other words, the region in which Russia has been trying for decades to prevent Western and NATO’s influence, and virtually any nonRussian power is witnessing China is expanding its allout influence. According to this, the question of this research is that despite Russia’s initial pessimism, what is the reason for Russia’s entry into China’s new Silk and Road initiative? In response, the hypothesis is that following Western pressure and sanctions against Russia after the Ukrainian crisis and the emergence of economic problems and political isolation, Russia decided to reduce its economic and political vulnerabilities by participating in China’s new plan. Russia also defines the Eurasian Economic Union project in line with China’s plan and seeks to reap its benefits by cooperating with the project. The research method is quantitative and the method of data collection is based on library and reliable internet sources. The main variable is Russia’s soft power balance and the dependent variable is Russia’s cooperation with China in the onebelt oneroad initiative. Finally, given the increasing pressure from Western countries on Russia in recent years, especially after the Crimean crisis and EU economic sanctions and increasing pressure from NATO, Russia has responded positively to China’s Silk and Road plan despite its initial reluctance. Of course, part of the reason for Russia’s acceptance of this plan was the inevitable economic expansion of China in Russia’s adjacent regions. However, Russia still has various and powerful instruments to counter and sabotage the Chinese plan, especially in Central Asian countries. In particular, Russia itself is the creator of plans and institutions for regional convergence such as the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, which in some cases contradict China’s plan. However, Russia did not oppose the Chinese project by redefining these institutions and taking a new approach to the possibility of “linking” the Eurasian Economic Union with the Chinese onebelt oneroad initiative. For more than two decades, Russia has sought to prevent foreign and Western powers from entering the postSoviet space by signing treaties, making agreements, establishing organizations, and even making political and economic pressures, especially in the field of energy. However, it has not been able to meet the different needs of the developing countries in its vicinity so the cooperation of these countries, especially the Central Asian countries with powers that were outside of the Commonwealth of Independent States was inevitable. Therefore, Russia seeks to reduce the possibility of western countries’ presence by accepting the presence of China, which is a potential longterm threat to Russia. Something that can be called elimination of evil by a worse evil. Russia’s neighboring regions are immediate and vital danger, but this country alone is not able to make a balance toward the West. Therefore, by aligning with China, it seeks to increase its balance of power with Western countries especially the United States. Hence, the key to understanding such Russian cooperation with China is the concept of balance, when issues exceed the balance, Russia also has considerations against expanding Chinese influence.