امکان روان‌شناسی به‌مثابه علم در فلسفۀ کانت

پس از گذشت حدود یک قرن و نیم از تاسیس علم روان‌شناسی در قرن نوزدهم، هنوز چیستی و امکان این علم که درصدد تبیین علمیِ آگاهی یا تجربۀ آگاهانه است، هم نزد روان‌شناسان و هم فیلسوفان محل پرسش و نزاع است. خاستگاه این نزاع که گویی بحرانی را در ذات(قلمرو) موضوع این علم به دوش می‌کشد، طرحی از معماری شناخت است که کانت در فلسفه استعلائی خود، مخصوصا در نقد اول یعنی نقد عقل محض، ارائه می‌دهد؛ طرحی که گویی امکان روان‌شناسی به‌مثابه علمی تجربی و آزمایشگاهی را ناممکن می‌کند. اما امکان یا امتناع علم روان‌شناسی در فلسفه کانت، امری کاملا بدیهی یا مطلق نیست. جستار پیش رو، تلاشی برای فهم این امکان یا امتناع در بستر کاوش در برداشت‌های مختلف کانت از روان‌شناسی است. با تفکیک بین سه‌گانۀ روان‌شناسی تجربی(آزمایشگاهی)، روان‌شناسی عقلی و انسان‌شناسی پراگماتیک، تمرکز بر دوگانۀ اول بوده و سعی بر آن است تا چیستی هر یک از آنها و امکان‌ تاسیس روان‌شناسی به‌مثابه علم، در هر یک از این دو تلقی، تاحدممکن آشکار شود و در پی این آشکارسازی، تحقق انضمامی علم روان‌شناسی پس از کانت نیز، بررسی گردد.

the possibility of psychology as a science in kant's philosophy

more than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. the roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the critique of pure reason. kant's framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in kant's philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. the present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining kant's various conceptions of psychology. by distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. the aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following kant.more than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. the roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the critique of pure reason. kant's framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in kant's philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. the present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining kant's various conceptions of psychology. by distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. the aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following kant.more than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. the roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the critique of pure reason. kant's framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science. yet, the possibility or impossibility of psychology in kant's philosophy is by no means self-evident or absolute. the present study seeks to elucidate this issue by examining kant's various conceptions of psychology. by distinguishing between the tripartite division of empirical (experimental) psychology, rational psychology, and pragmatic anthropology, the focus will be placed on the first two. the aim is to clarify, as far as possible, the nature of each of these conceptions and the extent to which psychology, as a scientific discipline, can be founded within each. finally, the paper also considers how psychology, as a concrete and institutionalized science, became possible in the period following kant.more than a century and a half after the establishment of psychology as a science in the nineteenth century, the very nature and possibility of this discipline—aimed at providing a scientific explanation of consciousness or conscious experience—remains a matter of debate among both psychologists and philosophers. the roots of this dispute, which seems to bear within itself a structural crisis in the very domain of its subject matter, lie in the architectural model of cognition that kant develops in his transcendental philosophy, especially in the critique of pure reason. kant's framework appears to render impossible the very notion of psychology as an empirical and experimental science.