از ساختار طبیعی تا الگوی اخلاقی: بررسی نقادانه‌ی نظریه‌ی فضیلت فوت و زگزبسکی

نظریه‌ی فضیلت، به منزله‌ی یکی از رویکردهای اصلی در اخلاق هنجاری، در قرن بیستم با آثار فیلسوفانی چون فیلیپا فوت و لیندا زگزبسکی احیا و به بدیلی برای پیامدگرایی و وظیفه‌گرایی بدل شد. فوت، در چارچوبی که می‌توان آن را طبیعی‌گرایی ارسطویی نامید، فضیلت‌ها را نه ساخته‌های ذهنی یا قراردادهای اجتماعی بلکه ویژگی‌هایی آفاقی می‌داند که در جهت تحقق غایت طبیعی و شکوفایی گونه‌ی انسانی عمل می‌کنند. او با ارجاع به مفهوم ضرورت‌های ارسطویی و نقش عقل عملی، استدلال می‌کند که داوری‌های اخلاقی در ساختار طبیعی زندگی انسان ریشه دارند و از شرایطی برمی‌خیزند که امکان شکوفایی حیات انسانی را فراهم می‌کنند. در سوی دیگر، زگزبسکی نظریه‌ای الگومدار و انگیزشی از فضیلت ارائه می‌کند که بر تجربه‌ی زیسته‌ی فاعل اخلاقی، تحسین الگوها و کوشش برای تشبّه به منش آنان متمرکز است. در این چشم‌انداز داوری اخلاقی نه صرفاً محصول استدلال عقلانی یا تحلیل مفهومی بلکه برآمده از واکنش‌های عاطفی و شهودهایی اخلاقی است که در مواجهه با الگوهای تحسین‌برانگیز پدید می‌آیند و راهنمای عمل اخلاقی می‌شوند. به‌رغم این تفاوت‌ها، امکان تلفیق عناصر اساسی این دو رویکرد وجود دارد. پیوند دادن بنیان‌های طبیعی و عقلانی نظریه‌ی فوت با مولفه‌های شهودی و الگومدار زگزبسکی می‌تواند زمینه‌ساز شکل‌گیری چشم‌اندازی دو‌سطحی و در اخلاق فضیلت شود که در آن عقل و طبیعت، از یک سو، و شهود و انگیزش، از سوی دیگر، در تبیین و راهبری زندگی اخلاقی نقش اساسی دارند.

from natural structure to moral exemplar: a critical analysis of the virtue theories of foot and zagzebski

virtue ethics, one of the three principal traditions of normative ethical theory alongside consequentialism and deontology, experienced a significant revival in the twentieth century, particularly through the seminal contributions of philippa foot and linda zagzebski. their theories represent two of the most influential and philosophically sophisticated attempts to reinterpret and rearticulate virtue ethics within a contemporary framework. both thinkers draw extensively on aristotelian thought, yet they diverge markedly in foundational assumptions, methodological strategies, and conceptions of normativity. together, their approaches illuminate central debates in modern ethical theory, including the grounding of moral obligation, the relationship between moral cognition and motivation, the nature of moral judgment, and the interplay between reason and affect in ethical deliberation.philippa foot advances a naturalistic and teleologically informed account of virtue ethics, situating moral evaluation within the objective conditions necessary for human flourishing. she rejects the notion that virtues are mere social conventions or subjective preferences, arguing instead that they constitute species-relative excellences indispensable to living well as human beings. drawing on the concept of aristotelian necessities, foot maintains that just as the flourishing of plants or animals depends upon the proper realization of their characteristic traits and functions, human flourishing requires the cultivation and exercise of dispositions such as justice, temperance, and courage. central to her framework is practical wisdom (phronesis), which enables the agent to discern the appropriate application of virtues in particular contexts, thereby bridging the descriptive aspects of human life with normative ethical evaluation. in doing so, foot seeks to overcome the persistent gap between factual understanding and moral prescription, grounding normative claims in the teleological structure of human nature.linda zagzebski, by contrast, develops an exemplarist and motivational model of virtue ethics that emphasizes the affective and psychological dimensions of moral life. according to her approach, moral understanding originates not in abstract principles or purely teleological reasoning but in the immediate experience of admiration for morally exemplary individuals. by observing and reflecting upon such exemplars—whose character inspires deep moral respect—we identify the traits that constitute genuine virtue. on this account, virtue is defined not only by the external conformity of action to moral standards but also by the internal quality of motivation, especially the sincere desire to promote the good for its own sake. moral knowledge and judgment emerge through processes of affective response, imitation, habituation, and careful reflection on exemplars, highlighting the formative role of admiration and the cultivation of moral sensibilities.despite their shared aristotelian heritage, foot and zagzebski diverge in fundamental ways. foot's approach is realist, externalist, and teleological, grounding normativity in the objective requirements of human nature and the conditions for flourishing. zagzebski's account, in contrast, is phenomenological, internalist, and motivational, locating normativity in the authority of exemplars and the affective power of moral admiration. foot emphasizes rationality, natural function, and the continuity between biological and ethical evaluation, whereas zagzebski foregrounds the emotional, motivational, and psychological dimensions of virtue, stressing character development and the internal cultivation of moral motivation. these differences reflect broader debates within contemporary virtue ethics regarding the relationship between reason and emotion, nature and culture, and objectivity and subjectivity.comparative analysis further shows how each thinker addresses contemporary challenges confronting virtue ethics, including conceptual circularity, the problem of action guidance, the empirical challenges posed by situationism, the threat of cultural relativism, and the is–ought gap. foot responds by emphasizing the teleological organization of human nature and the central role of phronesis in mediating between facts and norms. zagzebski, meanwhile, appeals to the epistemic and motivational authority of exemplars and the educative function of moral admiration, highlighting how virtuous dispositions are formed and sustained in practical life.taken together, the two approaches suggest not opposition but potential complementarity. foot's emphasis on natural teleology and objective normativity provides a firm account of the structural foundations of ethical evaluation, while zagzebski's focus on exemplarity, motivation, and moral psychology enriches our understanding of how virtue is perceived, internalized, and enacted. integrating these insights points toward a two-level model of virtue ethics: one level articulating the objective, species-relative conditions for human flourishing, and a second level elucidating the subjective processes of moral perception, motivation, and character formation. such a synthesis offers a comprehensive and dynamic conception of virtue, uniting natural and psychological, rational and emotional, and universal and particular dimensions within a coherent and practically relevant ethical framework.