value-ladeness of science and ethical naturalism

This article aims to defend a conditional proposition, or to be more precise a biconditional, one: if we reject that science is value-free, then we must also reject that values are independent of reality, and vice versa. therefore, arguments proposed against neutrality or value-freedom of science may also be applied in defending moral realism. two arguments for this claim will be provided. the first argument is based on conformational holism, and uses the fact that by assuming a holistic structure for the relation of theory and evidence one agrees that every criterion which is potentially useful as evidence for theories be subject to confirmation and disconfirmation by further empirical evidence. the second argument is based on anti-dogmatic nature of science i will then argue that among different forms of moral realism, ethical naturalism is the one that is better vindicated.

value-ladeness of science and ethical naturalism

this article aims to defend a conditional proposition, or to be more precise a biconditional, one: if we reject that science is value-free, then we must also reject that values are independent of reality, and vice versa. therefore, arguments proposed against neutrality or value-freedom of science may also be applied in defending moral realism. two arguments for this claim will be provided. the first argument is based on conformational holism, and uses the fact that by assuming a holistic structure for the relation of theory and evidence one agrees that every criterion which is potentially useful as evidence for theories be subject to confirmation and disconfirmation by further empirical evidence. the second argument is based on anti-dogmatic nature of science i will then argue that among different forms of moral realism, ethical naturalism is the one that is better vindicated.