neither individuals nor relations? a criticism of ontic structural realism from a naturalistic stance

I argue that the positive metaphysical content of ontic structural realism – the claim that structure is ontologically fundamental – is indefensible from a naturalistic perspective. my strategy is to show that the evidence and arguments advanced by ontic structural realists to motivate their positive thesis underdetermine the choice between it and another, contradictory thesis. i argue that there is no apparent way to break this underdetermination without adopting an anti-naturalistic approach to the human mind. the negative metaphysical content of ontic structural realism, however – the elimination of fundamental individuals with intrinsic nature – is untouched by this criticism and may be defended independently.

neither individuals nor relations? a criticism of ontic structural realism from a naturalistic stance

i argue that the positive metaphysical content of ontic structural realism – the claim that structure is ontologically fundamental – is indefensible from a naturalistic perspective. my strategy is to show that the evidence and arguments advanced by ontic structural realists to motivate their positive thesis underdetermine the choice between it and another, contradictory thesis. i argue that there is no apparent way to break this underdetermination without adopting an anti-naturalistic approach to the human mind. the negative metaphysical content of ontic structural realism, however – the elimination of fundamental individuals with intrinsic nature – is untouched by this criticism and may be defended independently.