دفاع از دیدگاه تناسب تبیین‌گرا در حمایت معرفتی

بنابر مهم ترین دیدگاهِ‌ تبیین‌گرا در حمایت معرفتی، رویکرد باوریِ شناسا به یک گزاره از حیث معرفتی به شرطی موجه است که آن رویکرد باوری نسبت به شواهدی که شناسا دارد، در تناسب باشد. دیدگاه‌های مختلفی کوشش نموده اند تا به این پرسش پاسخ دهند که یک رویکرد باوری تحت چه شرایطی با شواهد و ادله‌ای که شناسا دارد در تناسب است. در این مقاله به دیدگاه تناسب تبیین‌گرا در حمایت معرفتی می‌پردازیم. بنابر این دیدگاه، p با شواهد شناسا، e، در t در تناسب است اگر و تنها اگر یا p بخشی از بهترین تبیین در دسترسِ شناسا در t برای اینکه چرا وی e را دارد باشد یا p در دسترسِ شناسا به عنوانِ نتیجه‌ی منطقیِ بهترین تبیینِ در دسترسِ وی در t برای اینکه چرا وی e را دارد، باشد. پس از تقریر این دیدگاه در ضمنِ بیان و ارزیابیِ مهمترین مشکلات‌اش نشان می‌دهم که می‌توان از این دیدگاه در حمایت معرفتی دفاع کرد.

a defense of explanationist fit view about epistemic support

introduction: according to explanationist view about epistemicsupport, doxastic attitude d toward proposition p is epistemicallyjustified for s at t if and only if having d toward p fits the evidence s has at t . different viewpoints have tried to answer the question under what conditions a doxastic attitude is fit with the evidence it has. the purpose of this article is to evaluate the latest version of explanationist views in epistemic support. method: this research is an analytical descriptive kind of research.in this article, with an analytical descriptive approach and in asystematic manner and by observing the criteria of accuracy andreasoning, i try to defend mccain's explanationist fit view aboutepistemic support. this formulation of mccain's point of view has beenproposed for the first time, and this point of view causes some of theproblems to be solved in the explanationist point of view in evidentialfit. first, i will explain mccain's point of view in epistemic support,and then i will examine the problems of the explanationist point of viewin epistemic support in important kinds of belief. in addition topresenting the problems of mccain's view on a priori, introspective andmemory beliefs, i will try to show with him that this view providescorrect intuitive results in these cases as well.findings: the correctness of mccain's point of view regardingprior, introspective and memory beliefs was disputed. in this article, ishowed that not only the a priori of the justification of a belief does notrequire the lack of evidence for the justification of these beliefs, butalso the a priori propositions need evidence to justify themselves and i defended the way of justifying these beliefs based on the selectedexplanationist perspective. in addition, i showed that in memory beliefsas well, s has evidence to justify these beliefs, and the application ofthe selected point of view provide the correct intuitive result in thisbeliefs. in introspective beliefs, we also showed that the content ofintrospective beliefs is different from the experience of the contents ofthese beliefs, and therefore mccain's point of view has the possibilityof providing justification for these beliefs. as a result, in this research,while evaluating the perspective of ef in each of these beliefs, ishowed that, on the one hand, applying ef provides correct intuitiveresults about these beliefs, and on the other hand, it is possible todefend the response of believers to this perspective in epistemicsupport.conclusion: according to the most important explanationist view inepistemic support, the doxastic attitude to a proposition isepistemologically justified for one provided that the doxastic attitudefits the evidence that one has. different theories attempt to answer thisquestion that a doxastic attitude under what conditions fit the evidenceand reasons that one has. in this article, i discuss explanationist fit viewabout epistemic support according to this view, p fits s’s evidence, e,at t iff either p is part of the best explanation available to s at t for whys has e or p is available to s as a logical consequence of the bestexplanation available to s at t for why s has e. after explaining thisview, while expressing and evaluating its most important problems, ishow that this view can be defended in epistemic support.