ضدرئالیسم و رئالیسم عرفی: رورتی در مقابل پاتنم

علائق رئالیستی پاتنم او را بر آن می دارد که در دورۀ اخیر تفکرش، با دفاع از «رئالیسم عرفی»، در میان مواضع پراگماتیستیِ خود جایی برای حفظ تصور و معنایی شبیه «درستیِ» غیرمحلی (nonlocal) و ناگذرا (nontransient) که فلسفۀ رئالیستی در اختیار ما قرار می دهد، جستجو کند. در حالی که به عقیدۀ رورتی، مواضع پراگماتیستی صرفاً تا جایی قابل قبول هستند که بخواهیم بدون چنین معنا و تصوری عمل کنیم. این مقاله با استناد به مکاتبات انتقادی مستقیم این دو پراگماتیست، تقابل فکری آنها را مورد تحلیل و ارزیابی قرار می دهد. طبق نتیجۀ این پژوهش، دیدگاه ضدرئالیستی رورتی نتیجۀ ناگزیر پراگماتیسم مشترک او و پاتنم است. پاتنم نمی تواند ضمن ماندن در مرزهای پراگماتیسم، دیدگاه رورتی را مورد انتقاد قرار دهد. ویژگیِ ضدمطلق انگاری پراگماتیسم به این معناست که شهودهای رئالیستی عرف عام نیز مشمول تغیر و تحول تاریخی خواهند بود.

anti-realism and common sense realism rorty versus putnam

introduction: most of hilary putnam’s influential ideas are referred to his two fundamental commitments: pragmatism and realism. these two commitments caused the proximity and, at the same time, his intellectual distance from the other contemporary pragmatist, richard rorty. while committing to pragmatism, they have very different positions on realism. their difference is so problematic that the meaning of pragmatism will not be apparent if we count rorty and putnam together in the group of pragmatists. reviewing these two philosophers’ thoughts will help us determine how broad the horizons of pragmatism can be. intellectual opposition between rorty and putnam is discussed in this research. this research does not consider the intellectual opposition of these two philosophers based on non-pragmatist ideas. it is aimed to examine their intellectual coherence regarding their philosophical positions.methods: this research evaluates the intellectual opposition between rorty and putnam. the information cited in this article has been collected using the library method. furthermore, the method of information processing is comparative-analytical.findings: (1) despite the common pragmatist positions of rorty and putnam, what they really disagree with each other is what can be preserved from the realist tradition. in the recent period of his thinking, putnam, by defending common sense realism among his pragmatist positions, tries to find a place to preserve a notion and meaning similar to the nonlocal and nontransient rightness that realist philosophy provides. according to rorty, pragmatist positions are acceptable only to the extent that we want to practice without such meanings and notions. (2) the philosophical opposition between rorty and putnam is based on their metaphilosophical disagreement on pragmatism. putnam is convinced that the mere pragmatic convenience is not a suitable criterion for practice. according to putnam, common sense realism provides a minimally realistic insight into the truth that can guide pragmatic convenience in the right direction. in contrast, rorty believes that more and better convenience is the only condition that can provide us with a criterion for modifying current procedures while remaining within the limits of the anti-platonic commitments of pragmatism.conclusion: pragmatism is the mainstream of rorty and putnam’s thoughts. according to the results of this research, rorty takes a more original process in the path of pragmatism. putnam’s realistic concerns contradict his pragmatist positions. even though these concerns are followed in the framework of the minimal truth of common sense realism. by resorting to the determined truth lies at the heart of common sense realism, putnam loses the coherence of his thought. such a truth does not indicate particular pragmatic convenience except if used in a metaphysical, ahistorical sense. while the characteristic of pragmatism’s anti-absolutism means that the common sense, realistic intuitions will also be subject to historical changes. based on pragmatism, the hegelian historicization of philosophy is essential precisely because it grasped the emptiness of kantian attempts to regard truth as an ahistorical matter. putnam’s view is a return to pre-hegelian attempts to find something ahistorical to which philosophers can be committed to follow.