ابطال شبه پدیدارگرایی در نظریه دوگانه انگاری ویژگی

نظریه دوگانه‌انگاری ویژگی در فلسفه ذهن، انسان را از منظر جوهری، تماماً فیزیکی می‌داند، بااین‌وجود برای جوهر فیزیکی مذکور، دو نوع ویژگی قائل است؛ ویژگی فیزیکی و ویژگی غیرفیزیکی (ذهنی). دراین‌بین جدی‌ترین مشکل پیش‌‌روی دوگانه‌انگاران ویژگی، خطر سوق یافتن آن‌ها به‌طرف شبه‌پدیدارگرایی است. شبه‌پدیدارگرایی بدون این‌که اصل تحقق ویژگی‌های غیرفیزیکی (ذهنی) را طرد کند، علیّت و اثرگذاری آن را بر بدن فیزیکی نمی‌پذیرد. درنتیجه علاوه بر این‌که کار را برای کسی که می‌خواهد از دوگونه بودن ویژگی به دوگونه بودن جوهر پل بزند مشکل می‌کند، نفس دوگانه‌انگاری ویژگی را به یگانه‌انگاری سوق می‌دهد. در مقاله حاضر علاوه بر اشکالات خاستگاهی، اشکالات ساختاری و بنائی متعدّدی را در ابطال شبه‌پدیدارگرایی ارائه داده‌ و در انتها نظریاتی را که به پی‌پدیدارگرایی منتهی شده‌اند را نقد کرده‌ایم.

refutation of epiphenomenalism in the theory of the property dualism

introduction: the dualistic theory of the characteristic in the philosophy of mind considers human beings to be entirely physical from the point of view of substance, however, it assigns two types of characteristics to the said physical substance; physical property andnon-physical (mental) property. in the meantime, the most serious problem facing the dualists of the characteristic is the danger of them being pushed towards epiphenomenalism. epiphenomenalism does not accept the causality and effect on the physical body without rejecting the principle of realization of non-physical (mental) characteristics. as a result, in addition to making it difficult for someone who wants tobridge poperty dualism to substance dualism, the poperty dualism itself leads to monotheism. in this article, in addition to the originalproblems, we have presented several structural and structuralproblems in refuting epiphenomenalism, and at the end, we havecriticized the theories that led to epiphenomenalism.method of study: we use analytical-rational method in this article.findings: it should be said about the origin of epiphenomenalism;as mentioned, the basis of epiphenomenalism is the dualism ofcharacteristics; but it is questionable how a mental philosopher likejackson, who designed the cognition argument to prove thedistinction between mental and physical characteristics, has givenepiphenomenalism to mental qualities and like davidson for mentalcharacteristics do not have a causal role? (for further study on thechange of jackson's point of view, refer to: martin nida-remilin, itcan be said; the same explanatory gap that led to cartesian essencedualism despite its admirable advantages, the same crisis occurred forattribute dualism; to say that after descartes proposed the pineal gland in response to elizabeth's question about the interaction betweensoul and body, philosophers were disappointed with the way descarteswent and instead of repairing descartes' arguments (which waspossible because descartes' problem the failure to find a correctexplanation of the causality between the mind and the brain was notthe absence of any correct explanation - in this context, refer to:basically, he moved from essential dualism to homogenous,reductionist and physicalist theories such as behaviorism andfunctionalism.conclusion: for someone who accepts the poperty dualism, it isnecessary to remove the factor called epiphenomenalism, whichintroduces the mental attributes as secondary matters and considersthem to be ineffective especially in relation to mental matters. in thepresent article, in order to remove the obstacle calledepiphenomenalism, we stated in the first step, despite the fact that theorigin of epiphenomenalism, i.e. physical causal layer has beenproven to be distorted, this origin cannot be the causality of mentalaffairs in relation to in the second step, we proved that the promise ofepiphenomenalism practically destroys the dualistic structure of theattribute and once again leads it to monotheism. in the third step, weintroduced five forms based on epiphenomenalism; first, the manatthat neutralizes the effect of mental things on physical things, thesame manat can negate the effect of physical things on the mind,which is accepted by epiphenomenalism. secondly, believing in thedoctrine of epiphenomenalism is a self-contradictory event; becausethe mentioned belief is effective in epiphenomenalism behaviors.thirdly, acceptance of epiphenomenalism makes there is practicallyno difference between a zombie and a real person. fourthly, we canmake a proof with present and experimental premises and prove theeffect of mental things on physical things in a present-acquired(experimental) way. fifthly, the promise of epiphenomenalismactually denies what is confirmed by empirical science, because froman empirical point of view, mental matters (regardless of whether theyare physical or non-physical) affect physical matters.