داشتن شاهد در معرفت شناسی

دیدگاه‌های مختلف در توجیه معرفتی ناگزیر از پاسخ به این پرسش اند که شناسا تحت چه شرایطی یک شاهد را داراست. سه دیدگاه مهم درباره‌ چیستی داشتن شاهد میان معرفت‌شناسان وجود دارد: دیدگاه افراطی در داشتن شاهد، دیدگاه تفریطی در داشتن شاهد و دیدگاه میانه‌رو در داشتن شاهد. در این مقاله، در ضمنِ تبیین و ارزیابی ادله‌ی دیدگاه‌های سه‌گانه در داشتن شاهد، به این نظر می‌رسیم که از طرفی، دیدگاه‌های افراطی و تفریطی در داشتنِ شاهد قابل دفاع نیستند و از طرف دیگر، تقریری از دیدگاه میانه‌رو در داشتن شاهد قابل دفاع است. خواهیم دید که این دیدگاه از مشکلاتِ دیدگاه‌های رقیبش نیز مبرا است؛ از این رو، می‌توانیم بنابر این دیدگاه در داشتن شاهد، معتقد شویم که p شاهدِ در دسترسِ شناسا مربوط به q در t است اگر و تنها اگر در t یا شناسا بالفعل از p آگاه باشد یا شناسا مستعدِ به یادآوری p هنگامی که تامل درباره پرسش از صدقِ q می‌کند، باشد.

the nature of possessing evidence in epistemology

introduction: evidence in epistemology is good reasons that areindicative of the truth concerning the proposition that is the object ofthe doxastic attitude. we will see that believers in different views inepistemic justification must answer the question of when a person hasgood evidence. in this study, we seek to determine under whatcircumstances a person has a evidence; in other words, the purpose ofthis article is to explain and evaluate the views of epistemologists onwhat having a evidence is. it seems that any view in which one'sevidence interferes with justification in any way must answer thisquestion. all epistemologists who believe in internalism injustification must answer this question explicitly; because allinternalist believe that epistemic justification depends on the evidenceone has. in my opinion, both foundationalists and coherentists shouldaddress this issue. in addition, some externalist theories of epistemicjustification also say that a person's belief is justified or reasonable ifit is based on evidence. so they also have to look at the circumstancesunder which a person has a evidence.methodology: in this article, we first state what the characteristicsof an acceptable account of having a evidence should be. then we willmention the different account on this problem, then we will expressthe arguments and problems they face and finally we will adopt anacceptable account.finding: in this article, we examine the circumstances under whicha person has evidence. as we can see, among the three accounts ofevidence possession, the only one that can respond to its ownproblems and yield the intuitively correct results is the mvp *account. therefore, this account is accepted in having a evidence. so,from this point of view, in answer to the question of what it is like to have a evidence, we can say that s has p available as evidencerelevant to q at t iff at t s is currently aware of p or s is disposed tobring p to mind when reflecting on the question of q’s truth.conclusion: different theories of epistemic justification are boundto answer this question that under what conditions one has evidence.there are three important views concerning the nature of possessing:inclusive view of evidence possession, restrictive view of evidencepossession, moderate view of evidence possession. in this paper, wecome to this conclusion, after explanation and assessing reasons ofthese three views about the nature of evidence, that on the one handinclusive and restrictive views of evidence possession are indefensibleand on the other hand an account of moderate view of evidencepossession is defensible. we will see that this view is also free fromthe problems of its rival, so we can agree according to this view inpossessing evidence that s has p available as evidence relevant to q att iff at t s is currently aware of p or s is disposed to bring p to mindwhen reflecting on the question of q’s truth .