مقایسۀ استدلال موجهۀ چالمرز و کریپکی علیه مادی‌انگاری (نظریۀ این‌همانی)

یکی از استدلال‌ها به نفع دوگانه‌انگاری و علیه مادی‌انگاری استدلال تصورپذیری است. طبق استدلال تصورپذیری کریپکی، اگر جهان زامبی‌ تصوپذیر باشد، وجود زامبی‌ها به‌لحاظ متافیزیکی ممکن است. از‌این‌رو، آگاهی غیرفیزیکی است. به اصل تصورپذیری کریپکی اعتراض شده است که با پدیده ضرورت پسینی کریپکیایی سازگار نیست. از این‌رو، استدلال تصورپذیری صرفا حاکی از آن است که جهان زامبی منطقا ممکن است، اما امکان منطقی مستلزم امکان متافیزیکی نیست. چالمرز برای پاسخ‌گویی به این اعتراض از ایدۀ معناشناسی دوبعدی‌گرا بهره می‌گیرد. ضرورت پسینی کریپکیایی آن چیزی را که بروفق مفهوم اولیه تصورپذیر است، به‌لحاظ متافیزیکی غیرممکن نمی‌سازد. چالمرز می‌کوشد صورت‌بندی جدیدی از استدلال کریپکی علیه ماتریالیسم براساس ایدۀ دوبعدی‌گرایی به‌دست دهد. در نهایت، استدلال تصورپذیری کریپکی را با استدلال تصورپذیری چالمرز مقایسه می‌کنم.

comparison of chalmers and kripke's modalargument against materialism (theory of identity)

introduction: arguments in favor of dualism (and againstmaterialism) typically seek to move from the epistemologicaldistinction of physical facts and the facts of consciousness (consciousmental states) to the metaphysical distinction of physical processesand consciousness. these arguments often accept that epistemologicalpremise requires ontological results. the idea of conceivability is oneof these types of arguments. according to this argument, it isconceivable that there is an organ called a zombie that is the same asthe conscious being in all physical matters, but is completely devoidof conscious mental states. in this article, i intend to compare kripke's(1980) conceivability argument with chalmers' (1997; 2010)'sconceivability argument.according to kripke's argument, if pain and the firing of cfibersare the same, then this identity must be necessary. but thisidentity is possible, so one can imagine a possible world in which painoccurs without any brain state at all (the world of pain apart from thebody), and one can imagine a possible world in which the firing of cfibersoccurs without any pain (zombie world). as a result, in thosepossible worlds, the firing of c-fibers is not. one of the objectionsto kripke's argument is that the principle of conceivability isincompatible with the phenomenon of kripke's posterior necessity.according to the objection through a posteriori necessity, there is adifference between the conceivable (logical possibility) and the(metaphysical) possibility. the conceivability argument merely showsthat the zombie world is logically possible, but the logical possibilityof the zombie world is quite different from its metaphysicalpossibility; for conceptual possibility, mere conceptual coherence (orimpossibility) suffices, but we need something more to show that the zombie world has a metaphysical possibility.chalmers seeks to respond to this objection with the idea of twodimensionalsemantics. chalmers, of course, tries to formulate thesame kripke's conceivability argument against materialism based onthe idea of two-dimensional semantics. he argues that we can go fromepistemological premise (logical possibility) to ontologicalconclusions (metaphysical possibility). to do this, we need anintermediary. we must first infer justified epistemologies (ideas ofconceivable things) from epistemological premise (ideas of necessaryand possible things), and then arrive at ontological conclusions fromjustified premise. he clings to the idea of two-dimensional semanticsfor the connection between epistemological and modal premise..methods of study: in this article, first-hand and original sourceshave been used and an attempt has been made to obtain the desiredresults by using the method of conceptual analysis and theconventional method of philosophical reasoning.findings: in this article i have shown that 1) chalmers formulateskripke's argument based on the idea of two-dimensionalism. 2)kripke's argument was based entirely on the identity of consciousstates and physical states, while chalmers relied on the concept ofsupervenience of facts about consciousness on physical facts. 3)chalmers, unlike kripke, does not rely on essentialism aboutphenomena. 4) chalmers argues that kripke's arguments against tokenidentity are not conclusive, but that arguments against type identitywork. 5) chalmers, unlike kripke, tries to justify the transition fromthe primary conceivability to the primary possibility. but kripke takesthis transfer for granted.conclusion: both kripke (1980) and chalmers (1997; 2010)'sargument are based on the assumption that conceivability requirespossibility. in other words, both resort to the logical possibility ofseparating physical states from phenomenal states.keywords: kripke, chalmers, the idea of two-dimensionalsemantics, conceivability argument, dualism, and materialism.