معاهدات‌ اقتصادی‌ مالی ؛ راهبردی در جذب ارزش‌های اقتصادی خارجی

ﺳﺎﺑﻘﻪ و ﻫﺪف: اﻣﺮوزه اﮐﺜﺮ ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎ از ﭘﯿﻤﺎنﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﻣﺎﻟﯽ ﺑﺮای ﺣﻤﺎﯾﺖ و ﺣﻔﺎﻇﺖ از ﺣﻘﻮق ﺷﺮﮐﺖ ﻫﺎ، ﻫﻨﮕﺎم ﻓﻌﺎﻟﯿﺖ اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی در دﯾﮕﺮ ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﻣﯽ ﮐﻨﻨﺪ، در ﺣﺎﻟﯿﮑﻪ ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎی ﮐﻤﺘﺮ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﯾﺎﻓﺘﻪ ﭘﯿﻤﺎن ﻫﺎ را ﺑﻪ ﻗﺼﺪ ﺟﺬب ﺑﯿﺸﺘﺮ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﯿﺖ ﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﺧﺎرﺟ ﯽ و ﮐﺴﺐ ﺳﻬﻢ ﺑﯿﺸﺘﺮ در ﻓﻀﺎی رﻗﺎﺑﺘﯽ ﻣﻨﻌﻘﺪ ﻣﯽ ﮐﻨﻨﺪ. ﻟﺬا ﺑﻪ دﻟﯿﻞ اﻫﻤﯿﺖ ﭘﯿﻤﺎن ﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﻣﺎ ﻟﯽ، ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﺑﺎ ﻫﺪف ﺑﺮرﺳﯽ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻼت اﺳﺘﺤﮑﺎم ﭘﯿﻤﺎن ﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﻣﺎﻟﯽ، ﻋﺪم ﺛﺒﺎت ﻧﻈﺎم ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ و ﺳﺎﺧﺘﺎر ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ در ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﺷﺪ. روش: دادهﻫﺎی ﻣﺮﺑﻮط ﺑﻪ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﯿﺖ ﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی در ﺳﺎل 1401ﺑﺮای دوره 1398ﺗﺎ 1401ﺑﻨﮕﺎهﻫﺎی ﭼﻨﺪﻣﻠﯿﺘﯽ دارای ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻂ 4ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪﮔﺬاری ﺧﺎرﺟﯽ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ در ﺳﺎل ﺑﻪ ﺗﻌﺪاد 116اﻧﺘﺨﺎب و ﺟﻤﻊ آوری ﮔﺮدﯾﺪ و ﺑﺎ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده از رﮔﺮﺳﯿﻮن ﻟﺠﺴ ﺘﯿﮏ زوﺟﯽ ﻣﻮرد ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻞ ﻗﺮار ﮔﺮﻓﺖ ﯾﺎﻓﺘﻪﻫﺎ: ﻋﺪم ﺛﺒﺎت ﻧﻈﺎم ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ و اﺳﺘﺤﮑﺎم ﭘﯿﻤﺎنﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﻣﺎﻟﯽ ﺑﻪ ﺻﻮرت ﻏﯿﺮﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﯽ ﺗﺎﺛﯿﺮ ﻣﻌﻨﯽداری ﺑﺮ ﺳﺎﺧﺘﺎر ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ ﻧﺪاﺷﺘﻪ اﻣﺎ در ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﯽ ﺑﺎ اﻓﺰاﯾﺶ ﻋﺪم ﺛﺒﺎت ﻧﻈﺎم ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ، ﭘﯿﻤﺎنﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﻣﺎﻟﯽ اﻗﺪام ﺑﻪ ﻣﻌﮑﻮس ﮐﺮدن اوﻟﻮﯾﺖ ﻫﺎی ﺑﻨﮕﺎهﻫﺎی ﭼﻨﺪﻣﻠﯿﺘﯽ ﺟﻬﺖ اﻧﺘﺨﺎب ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ اﮐﺜﺮﯾﺖ ﺑﻪ ﺟﺎی ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ اﻗﻠﯿﺖ ﻣﯽ ﻧﻤﺎﯾﺪ. در ﺳﻄﻮح ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺮ ﻋﺪم ﺛﺒﺎت ﻧﻈﺎم ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ، اﺳﺘﺤﮑﺎم ﻗﺎﻃﻊﺗﺮ ﭘﯿﻤﺎنﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﻣﺎﻟﯽ، اﺣﺘﻤﺎل اﻓﺰاﯾﺶ اﻧﺘﺨﺎب ﺑﻨﮕﺎهﻫﺎی ﭼﻨﺪ ﻣﻠﯿﺘﯽ از ﺳﻬﺎم را اﻓﺰاﯾﺶ ﻣﯽدﻫﺪ . اﺳﺘﺤﮑﺎم ﭘﯿﻤﺎنﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﻣﺎﻟﯽ، راﺑﻄﻪ ﺑﯿﻦ ﻋﺪم ﺛﺒﺎت ﻧﻈﺎم ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ و ﺳﺎﺧﺘﺎر ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ را ﺗﻌﺪﯾﻞ ﻣﯽ ﮐﻨﺪ و ﺑﻨﮕﺎه ﻫﺎی ﭼﻨﺪ ﻣﻠﯿﺘﯽ را ﺗﺮﻏﯿﺐ ﻣﯽ ﮐﻨﺪ ﺗﺎ ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ اﮐﺜﺮﯾﺖ را ﺑﻪ ﺟﺎی اﻗﻠﯿﺖ اﻧﺘﺨﺎب ﮐﻨﻨﺪ. در ﻧﻬﺎﯾﺖ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺖ ﭼﻨﺪ ﺳﻄﺤﯽ از ﻣﺤﯿﻂ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﯿﺖ ﻫﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﺗﺠﺎری ﻧﺸﺎن ﻣﯽ دﻫﺪ ﮐﻪ ﺑﻨﮕﺎهﻫﺎی ﭼﻨﺪﻣﻠﯿﺘﯽ ﺑﯿﻦاﻟﻤﻠﻠﯽ، ﺑﺎﯾﺪ ﺿﻤﻦ ﻣﻮزون ﮐﺮدن ﺧﻄﺮات/رﯾﺴﮏ ﻫﺎ و ﻣﺰا ﯾ ﺎی اﺣﺘﻤﺎﻟﯽ، ﺗﻤﻬﯿﺪات ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺷﺮاﯾﻂ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻋﺪم ﺛﺒﺎت ﻧﻈﺎم ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ را در ﻧﻈﺮ ﺑﮕﯿﺮﻧﺪ. ﻧﺘﯿﺠﻪ ﮔﯿﺮی: ﻣﻌﺎﻫﺪات اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﻣﺎ ﻟﯽ ﺳﺨﺖﮔﯿﺮاﻧﻪ در اراﺋﻪ ﺗﻌﻬﺪ ﻣﻌﺘﺒﺮ در ﺑﺮاﺑﺮ ﺳﻠﺐ ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ و ﺗﺄﻣﯿﻦ ﻗﺪرت اﻃﻤﯿﻨﺎن ﺑﺨﺸﯽ ﮐﻪ اﻣﮑﺎن ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ اﮐﺜﺮﯾﺖ ﺗﻮﺳﻂ ﺑﻨﮕﺎهﻫﺎی ﭼﻨﺪﻣﻠﯿﺘﯽ در ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎی ﻣﯿﺰﺑﺎن در ﺳﻄﻮح ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺮ ﻋﺪم ﺛﺒﺎت ﻧﻈﺎم ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ را دارد، ﻣﺆﺛﺮ اﺳﺖ. ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮاﯾﻦ ﻃﺮاﺣﯽ ﯾﮏ ﺳﺎﺧﺘﺎر ﮐﺎﻫﺶ رﯾﺴﮏ در ﺳﻄﺢ ﺑﯿﻦاﻟﻤﻠﻠﯽ ﺑﺮ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﮕﯽ ﻣﺸﺎﻫﺪه ﺑﻨﮕﺎهﻫﺎ در ﯾﮏ ﻣﺤﯿﻂ ﻧﺎﭘﺎ ﯾﺪار اﺣﺘﻤﺎﻟﯽ در ﺳﻄﺢ ﻣﻠﯽ ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ ﻣﯽ ﮔﺬارد. در دﻧﯿﺎی رﻗﺎﺑﺘﯽ اﻣﺮوز، ﯾﮑﯽ از ﻣﺴﯿﺮﻫﺎی دﺳﺘﯿﺎﺑﯽ ﺑﻪ رﺷﺪ اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺮ ورود ﺑﻪ زﻧﺠﯿﺮهﻫﺎی ارزش ﺟﻬﺎﻧﯽ ﺑﻮده ﮐﻪ ﯾﮑﯽ از ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﻣﺆﺛﺮ ﺑﺮ ﻣﺸﺎرﮐﺖ زﻧﺠﯿﺮهﻫﺎی ارزش ﺟﻬﺎﻧﯽ، اﻓﺰاﯾﺶ ﺗﻌﺪاد ﻣﻌﺎﻫﺪات اﻗﺘﺼﺎدی ﻣﺎﻟﯽ دوﯾﺎ ﭼﻨﺪﺟﺎﻧﺒﻪ ﺑﯿﻦ ﮐﺸﻮرﻫﺎ ﺧﻮاﻫﺪ ﺑﻮد

economic and financial treaties; a strategy in attracting foreign economic values

background and objectives: in today's world, there are various contracts and legal frameworks for commercial economic activities. one of the most important frameworks in this field is economic and financial agreements. these agreements provide regulations and guarantees for those private companies that pursue economic activities or specifically foreign direct investment. when a company or an individual wants to do business or invest in another country, there is always a risk that the funds will be nationalized or confiscated in some way by the host country. in order to protect economic agents/investors and in order to support economic activities, most countries sign economic and financial agreements. logically, these agreements should be part of trade agreements, but they are usually implemented following a bilateral/multilateral or regional agreement between two/several countries. therefore, most of the countries use financial economic agreements to support and protect the rights of companies during their economic activities in other countries, while less developed countries conclude agreements with the intention of attracting more foreign economic activities and gaining a greater share in the competitive environment. therefore, due to the importance of financial economic agreements, the present research was considered with the aim of investigating the interactions between the rigidity and rigidity of financial economic agreements, the instability of the political system, and the ownership structure. materials and methods: data related to economic activities in the year 2022 for the period 2019 to 2022 multinational companies with an average of 4 new foreign investments per year were selected and collected with a final number of n = 116 and analyzed using paired logistic regression. results: regression was estimated in four models. in the first model, the three variables of instability of political system (pi), strength of treaties (tstr) and pi * tsrt are not considered and without considering these three variables, only two variables of economic activity laws and population have a significant effect. in the second model, among the three main variables, only the variable of political system instability (pi) was included in the model, and its effect alone is not significant (table 3, model 2). however, again, the two variables of laws of economic activities and population are significant. in the third model, among the three main variables, only the variable of the strength of traders' economic agreements (tstr) has been entered into the model, and again, statistically, the effect of the strength of financial economic agreements is not significant (model 3). however, again, the effect of two variables, laws of economic activities and population, are significant. in the fourth model, all three variables of political system instability (pi), strength of economic and financial agreements (tstr) and interactive variable pi * tsrt have been entered into the model. again, the two variables of laws of economic activities and population have a significant effect in this model. in addition, the interactive effect of pi * tsrt has become statistically significant, but the two variables of instability of the political system (pi) and strength of economic and financial agreements (tstr) are not significant. therefore, the interactive effect in model 4 shows that with the increase in the instability of the political system, very strict economic and financial agreements reverse the preference of multinational companies for minority ownership and make it more likely that multinational companies choose majority ownership. at higher levels of instability of the political system, greater strength in economic and financial agreements increases the possibility of increasing the choice of multinational companies from stocks. in other words, it is clear that stricter economic and financial agreements with increasing instability of the political system encourage multinational enterprises to choose majority ownership instead of minority ownership. finally, by replacing the instability of the political system with two other indicators of political uncertainty in the host country, supplementary tests were conducted as follows: the instability of the political system has been replaced by henize's political constraints index (polcon). for the political system instability variable, global governance indicators were used by reversing the political restrictions (polcon-1). the political constraints index (polcon) captures a different aspect of a country's level of political stability, i.e., the probability of political tolerance/stability by directly measuring the feasibility of policy change based on the structure of the country's political institutions (e.g., the number of veto points). which evaluates the complex relationship between the number of attempts to change and the degree of restriction in the policy making of the legislative and executive powers. equilibrium at all levels increases the possibility of policy change, thereby reducing the level of political constraints and increasing the capacity to draw conclusions from the government. possible scores for the final measure of political constraints range from zero (most dangerous) to one (most restrictive). this measure was reversed (polcon-1) to be consistent with the original test and a negative sign on the polcon-1 coefficient is expected as a direct effect and a positive sign for the interaction term. using economic freedom (inverse), an additional robustness test was implemented. conclusion: the instability of the political system and the rigidity/stringency of financial economic agreements in a non-interactive way did not have a significant effect on the choice of affiliated ownership, but in an interactive mode, with the increase in the instability o the political system, the economic and financial /commercial agreements reversed the priorities of multinational companies in order to choose majority ownership replaces minority ownership. at higher levels of instability of the political system, the more decisive rigidity of financial economic agreements increases the possibility of increasing the choice of multinational companies from stocks. the rigidity of financial economic agreements moderates the relationship between political system instability and the choice of affiliate ownership and encourages mnes to choose majority rather than minority ownership. finally, the multi-level nature of the environment of business economic activities shows that international multinational companies should consider different ownership arrangements under different conditions of instability of the political system, while balancing risks/risks and possible benefits. strict economic and financial agreements are effective in providing a credible commitment against expropriation and providing a reassuring power that allows majority ownership by multinational corporations in host countries at higher levels of political system instability. therefore, the design of a risk mitigation structure at the international level affects how firms view a potentially unstable environment at the national level . in today's competitive world, one of the ways to achieve higher economic growth is to enter global value chains, and one of the factors affecting the participation of global value chains will be the increase in the number of multilateral economic and financial treaties between countries.