virtue epistemological considerations on the problem of evil

The enduring problem of evil poses a prima facie rational tension with theistic belief in an omnibenevolent, omnipotent deity. the tension arises from the general idea that faultless disagreement about an alethic claim constitutes higher-order evidence against the claim. this is because neither party involved in the disagreement seems to have made a mistake. (wright, 2021) so, if the theistic belief purports to be truth-valuable, it should be rationally assigned less credence in the face of faultless disagreement about the problem of evil, hence, (at least) suspension of judgment. i aim to argue against this line of reasoning. in particular, i aim to show that the rationally appropriate doxastic stance towards this paradox for the religious believer is not one of suspended judgment, as it might initially seem demanded. such a response neglects the psychologically and existentially saturated nature of religious commitment. for the religious believer, belief in the divine is not just a philosophical proposition but an integral thread woven into her whole perspective, including her overall cognitive and value system. to bracket the belief would be to carry out a radical refactoring of her rationality itself, as it were, which could have significantly negative upshots. moreover, the potential cost of missing out on important truths as a result of bad suspension can be as significant as falsely believing. drawing from william james (1896), i argue that there are dual epistemic duties – not just to avoid false belief, but also to gain truth. over-emphasizing either duty through an excessive tendency to suspend judgment, just as an obdurate commitment to beliefs, reflects bias, and thus threats to develop epistemic cowardice. according to ichikawa’s definition of epistemic cowardice, easily abandoning belief exhibits epistemic cowardice: a disposition ‘to suspend judgment when one ought to believe, allowing one s beliefs to wither too quickly in the face of challenges’ (ichikawa, 2024: 33). of course, recognizing philosophical challenges like the problem of evil mandates some revision and attenuation of confidence, yet it does not require an outright suspension of judgment. the believer, in her pursuit of epistemic virtue, must not be entirely insensitive to the higher-order evidence constituted by a sustained lack of widespread agreement regarding the problem of evil. some nuanced self-awareness and confidence diminution are, therefore, not just recommended, but epistemically obligated. this is a sign of intellectual humility, essential for a balanced and informed belief system. but the point is, that giving up on one’s belief, on the other hand, is a sign of epistemic cowardice whose counterpart (i.e., epistemic courage) is equally essential for one’s belief system. thus, an ideally virtuous stance charts a mean between the vices of unwavering dogmatism and unnecessary concession. the former corresponds to epistemic stubbornness and is demanded by the recognition of faultless disagreement. the latter corresponds to epistemic cowardice, which is the critical focus of the present piece. so, what is the epistemically virtuous response for the believer to the (seemingly) faultless disagreement about the problem of evil? here are some suggestions. she could develop theodicies (or defenses); rely on an account of the problem in which existential and practical stakes prioritize truth adherence over skepticism; or, acknowledge the disagreement – acknowledging that her religious beliefs, however rationally held, could be nevertheless mistaken – but attest to her cognitive limitations as a finite human inquirer regarding the infinite/divine. in conclusion, the concept of an epistemically virtuous stance suggests that the believer should update the strength of her religious belief in the face of faultless disagreements, such as the problem of evil. however, this does not necessitate a complete abandonment of their belief, which would be a significant personal and existential cost. instead, they had better maintain their belief but with a recognition of its potential fallibility that their belief is open to revision in the face of future evidence or arguments.