an objection ad hominem against the argument from evil: why the proponent of the argument from evil against the existence of god cannot criticize the teleological argument for the existence of god?

I shall argue that these philosophers who criticize the teleological argument for the existence of god from a naturalistic point of view, by pointing out that from the fact that the world seems to be designed by an intelligent agent, it does not follow that the world was designed by an intelligent agent, deprive themselves of the possibility of formulating the crucial premise for both the logical and the evidential version of the argument from evil against the existence of god. the premise in question consists of two intertwining theses: firstly, that experience of evil exists, and secondly, that we can infer from this experience that real evil is instantiated in the world. if my argument is sound, it will turn out that the proponent of the argument from evil who at the same time criticizes the teleological argument in the way described above, is inconsistent when he tries to move from the first thesis (experience of evil exists) to the second thesis (evil exists). therefore, he is unable to provide a justification for the crucial premise in each version of the argument from evil, namely that evil exists. the main idea underlying this argument ad hominem goes as follows: in order to make plausible the crucial premise in the argument from evil we have to assume that it is inadmissible to distinguish the appearance from essence in the case of the experience of evil: if i experience evil it implies that evil exists, which means – in other words – that an illusion of evil is metaphysically impossible. but the thing is that in other polemical contexts, the proponent of the argument from evil explicitly denies the validity of this assumption. for instance, when he criticizes the teleological argument, he usually attempts to show that it is possible to distinguish the appearance from the essence in the case of teleological experiences. this implies that an illusion of teleology is metaphysically possible. therefore, the proponent of the argument from evil is either inconsistent or has to choose between the defense of the argument from evil and the critique of the teleological argument.