human freedom, sovereignty, and moral evil

I have defended (2022) a response to james sterba’s (2021) recent version of the logical problem of evil. sterba’s argument depends heavily on an analogy between the actions of a just god and the actions of a just state. in contrast to a substantial number of published objections to sterba’s argument (eg almeida 2020; attfield 2021; hasker 2020, 2021), i think that this analogy is at least somewhat appropriate. rather than attack the analogy in principle, my objection to sterba turns on the hypothesis that god’s relationship with humanity is justly circumscribed by the sovereignty of the latter. in the same way that a just state does not intervene in the affairs of a sovereign entity, even where they could have done so to the benefit of the latter, god’s interventions are circumscribed by considerations of what i call “human sovereignty”. in this paper, i set out some of the advantages of the account i began to develop in response to sterba. i argue that it has several notable advantages over the traditional free will theodicy, including that it explains why a just god would not intervene for the benefit of the innocent victims of moral evil when doing so does not take away human free will, and that it is compatible with sterba’s understanding of the “pauline principle”. in the final section of this paper, i consider one worry i have with my own solution, namely that it does not cohere well with the islamic tradition particularly the doctrine that sovereignty belongs to allah alone. i consider how i might modify my proposal, by analyzing the conception of ‘sovereignty’ that is required to make it work. i compare what i’m saying with some of the writings of the muʿtazilī theologians.