اثبات مدنی در پرتو اخلاقِ باور

اینکه قاضی باید به باور برسد و آنگاه اقدام به صدور رای کند، امری پذیرفته ‌شده در حقوق اثبات دعواست. مقدمه و پیش‌شرط صدور رای آن است که دادرس، موضوع دعوا را باور کند. از اساس، قابل تصور و پذیرش نیست که قاضی بدون تلاش برای کسب باور، تصمیم‌گیری کند. حصول باور، تابع مجموعه‌ای از هنجارها و قواعد است که به آنها «اخلاق باور» گفته می‌شود. هر باوری، با هر مبنایی نمی‌تواند معتبر تلقی شود. قرینه‌گرایان معتقدند معیار مقبولیت و اعتبار باورها، اتکای آنها به دلیل است. باور معتبر، باوری است که با قرائن و دلایل کافی توجیه شده باشد. باوری که به‌وسیله دلیل پشتیبانی نشده باشد، فاقد ارزش و اعتبار معرفتی است و نمی‌توان آن را مبنای عمل قرار داد. ضرورت تبعیت دادرس از قواعد مربوط به اخلاق باور، از آن حیث مضاعف است که باورهای قضایی متضمن پیامدهای مهم اجتماعی و عملی‌اند. باور دادرس، حقوق و شئون اجتماعی اشخاص را، به‌جدّ، تحت تاثیر قرار می‌دهد و ازاین‌رو، چگونگی دستیابی به باور برای قاضی،  اهمیت فوق‌العاده‌ای دارد. نوشتار حاضر، به شیوه توصیفی-تحلیلی، حقوق اثبات دعوا را با معیارهای اخلاق باور مورد مطالعه و تطبیق قرار داده است. اینکه قاضی اختیار ارزیابی آزادانه ادله را داشته باشد یا اینکه مجبور باشد به مفاد دلایل تن دهد و بر اساس آنها رای صادر کند، از مهم‌ترین چالش‌های اثبات دعواست. اگرچه ارزیابی آزادانه دلیل، رویکردی غالب در نظام‌های حقوقی است، اما توجه به مبانی اخلاق باور این واقعیت را روشن می‌سازد که باید به مفاد دلیل پایبند بود. قاضی نمی‌تواند به بهانه ارزیابی آزاد، از کنار دلایل عبور کند و به آنها ترتیب اثر ندهد. به‌نظر می‌رسد تحمیل دلیل، با مبانی اخلاق باور هماهنگی بیشتری دارد.

civil proof in the light of ethics of certitude

the fact that the judge must reach certitude and then proceed to issue a judgment is a truth acknowledged in the law of proof of claim. acquiring certitude is subject to a set of norms and rules called ethics of certitude. not all certitudes, with different bases, could be considered valid. regardless of the philosophical and epistemological issues regarding the nature of certitude, how to achieve it is also very important. relativists believe that the criterion of acceptability and validity of certitudes is their reliance on reason. a valid certitude is a certitude that is justified by sufficient evidence and reasons. a certitude that is not supported by reason lacks epistemological value and validity and cannot be used as a basis for action. the necessity of the judge’s compliance with the rules related to the ethics of certitude is higher because judicial certitudes involve important social and practical consequences. the certitude of the judge seriously affects the rights and social affairs of the people; therefore, achieving the certitude is extremely important to the judge. in a descriptive-analytical way, the present article examined and compared the rights of proof of litigation with the criteria of certitude ethics. whether the judge has the authority to evaluate the evidence freely or whether he has to agree to the provisions of the evidence and issue a verdict based on them are among the most critical challenges of proving a claim.the current study examined proving a lawsuit in the courts from the perspective of ethics of certitude. according to al-qaida, a judge must follow all the moral rules and knowledge frameworks to gain certitude, and only then can he make his certitude the basis for issuing a verdict. the basic question is whether it is possible to pay attention to these criteria in the court according to the rules governing the rights of proof of litigation and the criteria raised regarding the validity of certitudes. is it possible that the rules related to proof of litigation conflict with the principles of certitude ethics? one of the most important challenges ahead is the concept of imposing proof on the judge. some reasons, such as confessions, regardless of whether they convince the judge or not, must be the basis for a verdict. such a concept strengthens the hypothesis that it is basically not important for the legislator to believe in the judge, and contrary to the initial idea, the judge, without certitude and knowledge about the subject of the lawsuit, must also make his decision. on the other hand, the free assessment and the granting of absolute discretionary powers concerning the evidence in the case give rise to the fear of judicial tyranny and disregard for reasons. it seems that a correct understanding of how the judge acquires certitude is related to the fundamental positions in the ethics of certitude. without paying attention to these original foundations, getting a clear and comprehensive picture of the relationship between reason and the judge’s certitude is impossible. although the prevailing approach in the domestic and international legal systems is that the judge is free to evaluate and accept reason, epistemological investigations and attention to the foundations of moral certitude clarify that certitude gets its value and validity from reason and not vice versa. on this basis, it is not acceptable for the judge to hear (consider) the reason and pass it by without gaining certitude. either one should argue against the reason, or as long as the light of the reason is clear, one should stick to its implication and believe its contents. in this sense, the imposition of evidence and their priority on the judge’s certitude is more defensible than arbitrary freedom in accepting and rejecting evidence.