a lightweight rfid grouping proof protocol with forward secrecy and resistant to reader compromised attack

Today, passive rfid tags have many applications in various fields such as healthcare,transportation, asset management and supply chain management. in some of these applications,rfid tags are grouped and need to be proven that the tags of one group are in the same placeat the same time. to solve this problem, many protocols have been proposed so far, each ofthem has been able to solve some security and performance problems, but unfortunately manyof these protocols have security vulnerabilities or do not have the necessary performance to runon passive rfid tags. in this study, a secure and lightweight protocol for rfid tags groupingproof called lsgpp is proposed. in this protocol, the reader is an untrusted entity, in otherwords, the protocol is secure even if the reader is hijacked by an attacker. this study showsthat the lsgpp protocol is secure against tracking, eavesdropping, replay, concurrencyimpersonation, desynchronization, denial of service (dos), proof forgery, message integrityman-in-the-middle, secret disclosure, denial of proof (dop) and unlinkability attacks, andsupports anonymity and forward secrecy features. also, in this study, reader compromisedattack is proposed, and it is shown that the lsgpp protocol is also secure against this attack.also, using the proverif tool, it is shown that the proposed protocol provides confidentialityand authentication features. the lsgpp protocol uses lightweight operations affordable forpassive rfid tags and is shown to be compliant with the epc c1g2 standard.