ارزیابیِ نقدهایِ ابنِ رشد بر روشِ متصوّفه در الاهیات

ابنِ ‌رشد به‌هدفِ نقدِ روشی که «متصوّفه» در استنباط‌هایِ الاهیاتیِ خود برگزیده اند، دو ادعا به آنان نسبت می‌دهد: یک-متصوفه به روش‌هایِ نظری باور ندارند و، دو-به‌باورِ متصوفهْ معرفتْ تنها با پیراستنِ نفس از شهوت‌، و القاء از جانبِ خداوند شکل می‌گیرد. او معتقد است، تنها دلیلِ صوفیان بر این دعاوی ظاهرِ آیاتی از قرآن است؛ امّا ظواهرِ آیاتِ یادشده برایِ اثباتِ مقصودشان بسنده نیست. یک روش برایِ آن‌که موجّه و مقبول افتد، باید هم‌زمان سه مولّفه‌یِ «عمومیّت»، «سازگاری با ظواهرِ قرآن»، و «سازگاری با چارچوبِ منطقِ ارسطویی» را برآورد. ازنظرِ اوْ روشِ «متصوّفه» هیچ‌یک از سه مولّفه‌یِ گفته‌شده را ندارد. ما فهمِ ابنِ‌رشد از متصوفه را مفروض می‌گیریم و در درستیِ آن چون‌وچرا نمی‌‌کنیم و؛ سپس استدلال می‌آوریم که: (1) می‌توان از مُدّعایِ نسبت‌داده‌شده به صوفیان، صورت‌بندیِ منطقی و نظری ارائه داد؛ صورت‌بندی‌ای که حتا با پیش‌فرض‌هایِ روش‌شناختیِ ابنِ رشد سازگار باشد. (2) ظواهرِ آیاتِ موردِنزاع، به یک‌سان می‌تواند هم مُدعایِ صوفیان را اثبات نماید و هم مُدعایِ ابنِ رشد را. (3) ابنِ رشد در ظهوریابیِ خود از آیاتِ قرآن به شکاکیّتِ معناشناختی دچار می‌شود، ازاین‌رو نمی‌تواند ازپسِ تبیینِ هیچ آیه‌ای برآید. (4) ابنِ رشد در معناشناسیِ خود، تاویل براساسِ مبانیِ فلسفه‌یِ ارسطویی را برگزیده است؛ این‌نحوه تاویل‌کردن نه عمومیّت دارد و نه با ظواهرِ قرآن سازگار است؛ ازاین‌رو ایرادی که ابنِ‌رشد به متصوفه وارد می‌کند، خودشکن است. (5) ابنِ‌رشد از یک‌سو حقِ تاویل را از متصوفه سلب می‌کند؛ اما خودْ فراوان با مفروضاتِ ارسطویی به تاویل مبادرت می‌ورزد. (6) ابنِ رشد بینِ «اطلاق» و «عمومیّت» خلط کرده است.

evaluation of ibn rushd’s criticisms on sufi method in theology

for the purpose of criticizing the method chosen by the &mystics& in their theological inferences, ibn rushd attributes two claims to them: one- the mystics do not believe in theoretical methods and, two- the mystics believe in knowledge only by adorning the soul with lust, and induction from god. is formed he believes that the only proof of the sufis for these claims is the appearance of verses from the qur’an; but the appearances of the mentioned verses are not enough to prove their meaning. in order for a method to be justified and acceptable, it must simultaneously estimate the three components of &generality&, &compatibility with the appearances of the qur’an&, and &compatibility with the framework of aristotelian logic&. according to him, the &mystic& method does not have any of the three mentioned components.we assume ibn rushd’s understanding of mysticism and do not question its correctness. then we argue that: (1) it is possible to provide a logical formulation of the claims attributed to the sufis; a formulation that is compatible even with ibn rushd’s methodological assumptions. (2) the appearance of disputed verses can equally prove both sufis’ claim and ibn rushd’s claim. (3) ibn rushd is faced with semantic skepticism in his search for the qur’an’s verses,(4) in his semantics, ibn rushd chose interpretation based on the foundations of aristotelian philosophy; this way of interpreting is neither general nor compatible with the appearances of the qur’an; therefore, the objection that ibn rushd makes to sufis is self-defeating.extended abstract introductionthe dispute over the possibility or impossibility of proving god, and providing the best reason for proving his existence, is one of the most important controversies in the philosophy of religion. the question of god’s existence is the most important theological issue in most theological systems. assuming the possibility of proving god’s existence is accepted, three basic questions arise:(1) what is the best way to prove god?(2) is belief in god a prerequisite for accepting a method of proving god, or do we first choose an established method of proving god, and then start proving god based on that method?(3) what is the science attributed to god? is the only possible method a method that falls within the realm of aristotelian forms of logic, and is it possible to study and search for said method in the form of an aristotelian form of logic?of these three emerging methodological conflicts, only (3) has been addressed; we have pursued it in light of the conflict between averroes and sufism, and have shown that even by referring to averroes’ views, a justifiable formulation of sufi claims can be obtained.it must be noted that we have assumed averroes’ understanding of sufi claims as a muslim, and we do not dispute its validity; we have gone to averroes’ epistemological and logical views to prove this claim that what averroes attributes to the sufi is consistent and justified with his principles, and that the sufi has nothing to do with any of averroes’ criticisms. methodsin this research, we have followed the method of philosophical analysis; a priori epistemological analysis; that is, we ignore all psychological and social background evidence so that the discussion can proceed in a completely rational manner. intuition is independent of the knower’s experiences; the previous methods are methods that rely entirely on our intellectual intuition; in this set of methods the researcher can conduct the research even if they do not have any empirical data.however, a posteriori methods are directly related to our psychological and social experiences, so that these methods cannot be used without empirical data. our research is text-oriented and starts with reference to averroes’ main texts. this means that we made his treatise al-kashf the centerpiece of the analysis, and then by referring to his other works, we proved the inconsistency of his claims in his attribution and criticisms of sufism. findings1. averroes did not have a justified and accurate understanding of sufi claims; nor was he able to properly articulate their epistemological and semantic foundations.2. sufi claims can also be compatible with averroes’ analytical approach; that is, averroes is committed to accepting sufi claims even on his own epistemological and logical grounds.3. sufis have not made claims against qur’anic phenomena; their disagreement with averroes is in the interpretation, explanation, and exemplification of qur’anic phenomena, not in the principle of proof of qur’anic phenomena.4. the epistemological foundations of sufism have much in common with psychological epistemology, especially with the philosophical views of john stuart mill; both pay attention, in the process of acquiring knowledge, to the mental and emotional state of the knower and offer an enlightened interpretation of it.5. averroes’ semantics does not have a systematic and defensible structure because inference from appearances cannot be identified and defined within the framework of aristotelian logic, and this logic fails to provide a solution for finding appearances; therefore, he finally suffers from a kind of “semantic skepticism” conclusion1. averroes’ sufi claim is not alien to aristotelian logical reasoning. 2. the sufi claim has the potential to be compatible with averroes’ epistemological premises.3. the formulation of the mystic’s claim may be compatible with the foundations of psychological epistemology - an epistemological theory that holds that knowledge formation depends on the mental states of the knowing subject.another reason averroes gives for criticizing the sufi doctrine is the incompatibility of the sufi’s claims with qur’anic manifestations. this issue is also not included because, first, the qur’anic manifestations refer to both averroes’ and sufis’ claims equally; second, averroes’ method of semantics is ineffective, does not clarify the meanings of the verses, and ultimately leads to semantic doubt. thirdly, the contradiction with the qur’anic phenomenon alone is not a proof of the invalidity of the claim, because ibn rushd also deviated from the phenomenon many times.