epistemology of religious disagreement and practical theistic considerations

The recent attention to the epistemology of disagreement has led to the emergence of several theories, including conciliatory and steadfast views. in the philosophy of religion, while the problem is explored about religious disagreement by the same pattern, it is not broadly noticed that the practical significance of religious beliefs may influence the rationality of the approach one must have toward it. practical considerations about theism have led to various pragmatic arguments for the existence of god in philosophical literature. they might similarly provide prudential and moral reasons for ignoring religious disagreement. however, as the validity of the very arguments is also under dispute, they could not directly solve the issue by supporting a specific opinion. rather, as i argue, they should indirectly affect the process of inquiry one must take and the extent to which one must pay attention to relevant evidence and arguments. in this essay, i first briefly review the epistemology of religious disagreement by differentiating conciliatory and steadfast policies. then, i turn to several practical arguments for theism and their objections. finally, i indicate how pragmatic considerations may affect the rationality of religious disagreement with due attention to the ethics of belief and the problem of doxastic voluntarism