Can Atheism Be Properly Basic?

In this paper, i defend the claim that atheism cannot be rational without any arguments for its support, while belief in god and christianity, in particular, can be rational or justified, even if there are no arguments for it. just to be clear: i think there are perfectly fine arguments for the existence of god. what i have in mind are such arguments as the cosmological argument, the fine-tuning argument, the moral argument, and the argument from consciousness. in fact, elsewhere i have defended them in detail. i also believe there are various plausible historical arguments for various core ideas in christianity. yet, the point here is this: even if there were no such arguments for god’s existence or even if belief in god is in no way based on them, belief in god can still be perfectly rational; there is nothing intellectually deficient about it. following thomas aquinas and john calvin, this view has been championed by a substantial number of recent christian philosophers, such as william alston, alvin plantinga, and nicholas wolterstorff. the movement is called ‘reformed epistemology’. now, remarkably, it seems one cannot say something similar about atheism. atheism, i will argue, can be rational or intellectually responsible only if it is based on arguments against god’s existence. i think this remarkable asymmetry has been overlooked in debates and the literature. therefore, in this paper, i explore and defend this asymmetry between atheism and belief in god in detail.now, in this paper, i will focus on christianity. let me stress, though, that the point would even apply to, say, islam or judaism: any worldview on which the universe and human beings have been created by an all-powerful and perfectly good god leaves plenty of room for rational belief in god without any arguments. in other words: any theistic worldview that postulates the existence of god as traditionally conceived in the abrahamic religions permits rational belief in god without arguments. as we shall see, no version of atheism can leave such a room.now, i think this is not merely an intellectual point: it is of crucial importance for all sorts of practical issues. needless to say, christianity and atheism are hotly debated positions in the public debate and philosophical literature. it would be rather surprising if one of the two positions had some sort of presumption: the one needs arguments in its defense and the other does not. imagine that moral objectivism would need no arguments while moral constructivism would, or that political conservatism would need no arguments whereas political liberalism would. that would be striking and that would influence the debate. in fact, it would be so surprising that it is hard to even imagine such a situation; it seems to us that the onus of proof is not merely on one side in these debates.if i am right about this crucial difference between christianity and atheism, though, then all the christian would need to do in order to rationally believe in god is be able to explain why the arguments against god's existence are not convincing. the atheist would have to do much more: she would not only have to show that the arguments for god’s existence are not convincing, but also that there are actually convincing arguments to think that there is no god. various philosophers and theologians, such as john mackie, have claimed that the onus of proof is equally on both sides in this debate. if i am right, he is mistaken. there is an even larger number of philosophers who have claimed that the onus of proof is entirely on the believer’s side. here, i think of anthony flew, aaron holland, michael martin, michael scriven, and michael tooley. if i am right, they are even more mistaken.