a critical study of application of skeptical methodology by prominent atheists

From a descriptive perspective, when prominent atheists use skeptical method for rejecting theistic subjects (e.g. arguments about the existence of god), they almost always, apply a unique precision; which is very important and even admirable regarding philosophical methodology (regardless of different philosophical schools and whether one agrees with the stands and/or result of skeptics’ argument or not). for example, atheists (like hume, marx, freud, russell, mackie, dennett, dawkins, harris, and hitchens) demand matchless precision in definition of concepts even for the ordinary concepts which are frequently used in everyday conversations; even at times they demand formal, delimited and/or essential definition. most of the times the precision does not stop after the definition is offered, rather even after the formal, delimited and essential definition of most ordinary terms has been offered, the more familiar concepts - by which the ordinary terms were defined - will be again exposed to the same process. other examples include casting doubt on the following issues: observer-dependency of descriptions and/or observations, existence of ontological issues, epistemological possibilities of knowing the issues whose existence has been proved, with whom rests the burden of prove, validity, reliability, design and the methodology of scientific researches that support theism, and so on. but, interestingly, when the same atheists offer their arguments to disprove the existence of god, the methodic and methodological precision is given up; and in a sense, the commitment to skepticism is discarded. for example, regarding the famous argument against theodicy or “the problem of evil”, which was formulated precisely by hume; none of the abovementioned atheists emphasize on the “precise” definition of “the concept of evil” or “the more familiar concepts” by which evil is defined! in other words, they do not apply the same methodological precision to the definition of evil that they use for the precise, formal, essential and delimited definition of, let’s say, the concept of “design” in the “argument from design”. similar instances are ample in the atheists’ science-based arguments about theistic subjects. the abovementioned atheists easily use scientific studies against theistic stands, but they are very skeptic about scientific researches that confirm benefits and advantages of religion. for example, if a research confirms that religious people have lower level of anxiety, they question the number of participants, randomness of sampling, etc., which are all relevant, but theses questions should be also relevant when a scientific research rejects the benefit of religion or confirms its harms. it is pertinent here to mention that this paper doesn’t aim to study any of these stands. the contention of this research is that when atheists offer their arguments against theistic stands, they don’t apply the same methodological precision that they use in their arguments to prove their atheistic stands. this duality has been formulated in this paper as a “methodological double-standard”. this paper is an attempt to critically study the skeptical methodology of prominent atheists by emphasizing on some examples regarding which the atheists have applied “double-standards”.