Some Comments on the Kalam Cosmological Argument and the First Instance of Time

One of the good arguments for the existence of god that has drawn special attention in recent years is the kalam cosmological argument. william lane craig and james d. sinclair put it in the following way (craig and sinclair, 2009, pp. 102):1.0. everything that begins to exist has a cause.2.0. the universe began to exist.3.0. therefore, the universe has a cause.one of the reasons given by william lane craig and james d. sinclair to justify the second premise of this argument is to resort to the big bang theory, which assumes that the life of the universe, given general relativity, the best our theory of high velocities and large scales, is about 13.8 billion years old. accepting this conclusion of the big bang theory, implying that the universe has a nite life, means that the universe began to exist.in fact, there are two general conceptions of singularities in general relativity (lam, 2007): the rst is the view according to which singularities are not physically meaningful, which are the evidence for inadequacy of the theory in those domains, will probably be resolved by a quantum gravity theory, and the second is the view that singularities indicate essential features of space-time; in other words, they inform us there are some physical, conceptual, and fundamental issues, should be adequately addressed.we take the second stance, for the reasons will be explained in the following, so the big bang singularity, in our view, has a special status.but here, some philosophers, such as grunbaum (1991), take it for granted that it presupposes a time before the rst time, and therefore consider it unreasonable. in his book (1995), earman presents a mathematical method to show that by setting some boundary to the space-time, one can make both existence the rst instant of time and that each time event has a cause that preceded it possible; in this way, the objection can be met. on other hand, smith (2000) by making a distinction between two conceptions of atheistic positions, the strong and weak, according to the former atheism is both acceptable and compelling, while according to the latter it is acceptable, yet not compelling, argues against earman’s position. he says that his position is the strong atheistic and asserts that he defends this view in the paper, against earman’s. i attempt to show that he fails.