why we do not need demonstrative proof for god’s existence to know that god exists: robert nozick’s case for the existence of god

Our experiences shape our lives. the more an experience is exceptional, the more it will shape life. the experience of encountering the most profound reality shapes life tremendously. the authenticity of the experience itself and that it shapes life speaks about its objectivity. we can call this argument the argument from experience to shape a life – or, simply, “nozick’s argument for god”. the argument reveals that our “fundamental connection with the world is not explanatory, but one of relation and trust” (nozick, 1989: 53). however, not only the relationship of trust but also the relationship of affirmation is needed for experience to shape a life. with the second element, there is the “fullest power” (1989: 53) to shape one’s life. nozick argues that the additional reasoning—the “argument from the best explanation” (1989: 51)—can show how faith is not irrational, by pointing out that what we have experienced can be explained most appropriately with the qualities possessed by the supreme being. nozik further indicates why this line of reasoning does not lead to dogmatism suggesting the idea of faith as something rather investigative. this argument belongs to the larger group of intuitionistic reasoning like, for example, the famous al kalām cosmological argument (copan and craig, 2019). intuitions are here understood as dispositions to believe (van inwagen, 1997). the argument’s purpose is threefold: it aims to establish a certain sort of experience (religious/faith, spiritual) as a necessary element for building a plausible argument for god’s existence, to affirm the existence of unlimited being based on the proper concept of it, and, finally, to show that faith-based argument for god’s existence does not have to be dogmatic. by exploring the merits of nozick’s argument, i will try to elicit all three components of nozick’s argument by placing them within the broader discussion of the role of intuitive arguments in metaphysics.