What Can Evil (Rationally) Test?

The idea that evil is created or allowed by god to test human beings has deep theological roots both in the qur’an and the scriptures. but up until now, few attempts have been made to formalize a testing theodicy, maybe because philosophers have struggled to think of a philosophical framework which would make this idea viable enough to stand against the challenges of the problem of evil. in his 2010 article in sophia, jeremy randel koons tries to make explicit the problems that beset any attempt to work out a testing theodicy. he suggests that the most plausible object of such testing is faith conceived of as trust or loyalty. but he argues that the very existence of evil serves as counterevidence which undermines the rationality of showing these attitudes towards god. since a person who inflicts suffering on you just to see whether you still trust him is untrustworthy. similarly, a person who makes you suffer to see whether you remain loyal to him does not deserve your loyalty. as such, the rational response in these cases is to change these attitudes, not to stick to them. therefore, evil cannot rationally test human beings and, a fortiori, the alleged testing function of evil is of no help in solving the problem of evil. of course, testing theodicy should not be expected to account for all kinds of evil. nevertheless, if randel koons’s objection is right, then evil cannot play any rational testing role for human beings. in this paper, i put forward another version of the testing theodicy and show that it is not subject to the problem randel koons diagnoses in the cases he considers. according to my proposal, what is supposed to be tested through evil and suffering is the theistic commitment of human beings, which is a normative commitment they undertake to adhere to a theistic framework of values in their life. like other normative commitments one undertakes, fulfilling this commitment is a conceptual norm and evil provides situations where the subject may waver or fail in discharging this commitment. as such, evil and suffering can show the importance and priority one accords to this commitment in his/her life. unlike the test of trust or loyalty that randel koons discusses, evil cannot undermine the rationality of this normative commitment because, as i argue, the fact that god may allow you to suffer has no bearing to the rationality of this commitment and, moreover, the function that evil plays in testing whether you discharge this commitment cannot be achieved without evil. the upshot is that the existence of evil and suffering can, sometimes, play a rational testing role for human beings.