intuitions as intellectual perceptions: how intuitional experience can justify belief in god?

Religious experiences sometimes occur for some people. there may be a kind of seeming in these experiences according to which a transcendent and all-encompassing being -god- exists. this experiential characteristic of religions has been actually very important because it can partially account for why religions usually have such an enormous existential effect on human life. these experiences prevent god to be just a hypothesis and often turn him to a living reality who dominates the lives of human beings. but these religious experiences certainly can't be considered as perceptual ones. my suggestion is that we can put them under the general category of intuitional experiences. so being in a position to have a religious experience for the existence of god should be considered as identical to being in a position to have a certain intuition for that claim. can these kind of intuitional experiences provide justification for the belief that god exists? in order to reply to this question, we should explain how other experiences -for example perceptual experiences- generally justify the relevant beliefs. the most proper candidate for the best point of departure seems to be the doctrine of phenomenal dogmatism about perceptual justification. according to the doctrine, if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby possess some prima facie justification for believing that p. a series of objections have been raised against the doctrine of phenomenal dogmatism and so whether it will be acceptable or not depends on how one treats with the objections. after setting the scene and introducing the required concepts and definitions in section 1, i address one of the most important objections to the claim that experiences justify beliefs on their own in section 2 of this paper. according to this objection –which is raised by richard fumerton- experiences are not able to justify beliefs on their own but only do so in conjunction with support for background beliefs about how the experiences are best explained. on this view, perceptual experiences only ever give us non-basic justification for beliefs about the external world. after assessing this objection, i will show that it is not the case. in doing so i'll refer to the work of nicholas silins in which he tries to explain how -contrary to fumerton's claim- perceptual experiences can provide basic justification for beliefs about the external world. whether silins's suggestion will work or not is one of the underdeveloped aspects of this debate and therefore i'll assess it in more details in section 2. if perceptions provide basic justification then they can play the justificatory role in the case of beliefs on their own and the doctrine of phenomenal dogmatism will be saved. then in section 3, i will return to the structure of intuitional experiences and will argue for the claim that their structure is adequately similar to the structure of perceptual experiences. in other words, while perceptual experiences purport to reveal how matters generally stand in concrete reality, intuitions purport to reveal how matters generally stand in abstract reality and therefore we can rationally consider our intuitions as a kind of intellectual perception. for analyzing this similarity, i'll focus on the work of chudnoff about modelling intuitions as some kind of perceptions and try to give a different articulation of it. this similarity (if can be defended) is evidence for the belief that the doctrine of phenomenal dogmatism can be true in the case of intellectual perceptions viz intuitions. so from the combination of the results of sections 2 and 3, we will possess some evidence to believe that intuitional experiences can provide some prima facie justification for the relevant beliefs and they do so on their own. this means that having an intuitional experience to the effect that god exists, can provide you at least with some prima facie justification for the belief that god exists.