On the Epistemic Function of Qur’Anic Āyāt As Theistic Evidence

In this paper, i attempt to outline at least one approach toward understanding the epistemic role of qur’anic āyāt (particularly those in reference to natural phenomena), functioning as ‘proof’ or ‘evidence’ for the existence of god (and perhaps even by extension, islam itself?). more precisely, i consider the epistemic role these āyāt are supposed to play in ‘pointing’ to god’s existence i.e., in deductive, inductive, perceptual and/or tacit inference-based terms. in other words, what sort of evidence are we to understand āyāt as taking? and in what sense might a believer be justified (reasonable, rational, warranted) in her holding her theistic beliefs on the basis of āyāt. to take up the task, i focus on ibn taymiyya’s (d. 1328) understanding of an “inference through signs” (istidlāl bi’l āyāt), contrasting his approach toward theistic āyāt with that of ibn rushd (d. 1198). in order to construct what i would take to be a robust contemporary philosophical understanding of the epistemic function āyāt are supposed to play, i draw on the work of philosophers in the contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. particularly alvin plantinga, stephen wykstra and c. stephen evans.having considered what i take to be ibn rushd’s inductive approach in understanding the qur’anic āyāt as ‘traditional’ inferences/arguments to the existence of god, i turn toward ibn taymiyya’s approach which i hold to be neither inductive nor deductive in any traditional sense. rather, ibn taymiyya appears to understand the epistemic function of āyāt as either: (a) perceptual in what i take to be a plantingian sense (with the relevant comparison here also marked due to a similar proper function based approach to knowledge – ibn taymiyya emphasises the fiṭra as the relevant module which, if functioning as it ought, will allow the believer to obtain knowledge of god). or (b) a wykstrian like tacit-inference model. finally, i draw on c. stephen evans in considering how qur’anic āyāt may also form the basis of more traditionally inferences, something ibn taymiyya admits and holds to be necessary for those whose fiṭra lacks proper function. i conclude by suggesting that this taymiyyan approach makes more sense of the designated epistemic function for which god revealed his signs.