practical differential fault analysis on skinny

Skinny is a lightweight tweakable block cipher that for the first time introduced in crypto 2016. skinny is considered in two block sizes: 64 bits and 128 bits, as well as three tweak versions. in the beginning, this paper reflects our findings that improve the effectiveness of dfa analysis on skinny, then accomplishes the hardware implementation of this attack on skinny. assuming that tweak is fixed, we first present the enhanced dfa on skinny64-64 and skinny128-128. in order to retrieve the master key with the minimum number of faults, this approach depends on fault propagation in intermediate rounds. in our latest evaluations we can retrieve the master key with 2 and 3 faults in skinny64-64 and skinny128-128respectively. this result should be compared with 3 and 4 faults for 64-bit and 128-bit versions respectively, in the models presented in the former work. using the glitch model as well as a set of affordable hardware equipment, we injected faults into various rounds of the skinny algorithm in the implementation phase. more accurately, we can inject a single nibble fault into a particular round by determining the precise timing of the execution sub-function.