Enhanced Flush+Reload Attack on Aes

In cloud computing, multiple users can share the same physical machine that can potentially leak secret information, in particular when the memory de-duplication is enabled. flush+reload attack is a cache-based attack that makes use of resource sharing. t-table implementation of aes is commonly used in the crypto libraries like openssl. several flush+reload attacks on t-table implementation of aes have been proposed in the literature which requires a notable number of encryptions. in this paper, we present a technique to enhance the flush+reload attack on aes in the ciphertext-only scenario by significantly reducing the number of needed encryptions in both native and cross-vm setups. in this paper, we focus on finding the wrong key candidates and keep the right key by considering only the cache miss event. our attack is faster than previous flush+reload attacks. in particular, our method can speed-up the flush+reload attack in cross-vm environment significantly. to verify the theoretical model, we implemented the proposed attack.