The revenue and preservation-technology investment sharing contract in the fresh-product supply chain:A game-theoretic approach

This research considers a fresh-product supply chain consisting of a single-buyer and a single-supplier for deteriorating products where the market demand is dependent on the retail price and fresh rate of products. firstly, in a competitive model, the primary decision variables (i.e., the supplier's wholesale price and preservationtechnology investment and also buyer's order quantity and retail price) are determined. afterward, a centralized model is developed to optimize the whole system so that all the players inthe supply chain reach equilibrium. then, a combined incentive mechanism based on revenue and preservation-technology investment sharing is designed to motivate the members to participate in the centralized model. finally, the proposed models are accredited with the data set of a real-life application. the results indicate that the designed contract is capable of coordinating the fresh-product supply chain under a wide variety of sharing rate. moreover, the transactions in the centralized mode will have less lost-of-profit than the decentralized ones while it also has a higher whole channel's profit.