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Welfare comparison of leader-follower models in a mixed duopoly
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نویسنده
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tao a. ,zhu y. ,zou x.
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منبع
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journal of applied mathematics - 2013 - دوره : 2013 - شماره : 0
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چکیده
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In the standard leader-follower duopoly models with otherwise symmetric firms,the market outcome and total welfare are the same whichever firm is the leader. this paper studies and compares total welfare in a sequential-move mixed duopoly when either the public firm or the private firm acts as the leader. it is found that the fact that which firm is the leader affects total welfare and that whether firms compete in quantity or price also affects the optimal choice of market leader. © 2013 aiyuan tao et al.
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آدرس
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school of mathematics and information science,shanghai lixin university of commerce, China, accounting research institute, China, school of accounting and finance, China
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Authors
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