مسئولیت مدنی (مهرالمثل، ارش البکاره و جبران خسارت معنوی) و کیفری زنا با وعده‌‌ی ازدواج با تاکید بر رای هیات عمومی شعب کیفری دیوانعالی کشور

زنای به عنف مقابل زنای مطاوعی متضمن احکام وضعی و تکلیفی متفاوت است. جنبه‌‌های دوگانه‌‌ی الهی و مردمی زنای به عنف بخلاف جنبه‌‌ی یگانه و حق اللهی محض زنای مطاوعی مقتضی اتخاذ رویکرد افتراقی با هدف حمایت از مزنی بها می‌‌باشد. زنا با وعده‌‌ی ازدواج از چالش‌‌های حقوقی تشخیص نوع زنا و چند و چون مسئولیت کیفری و مدنی آن و موجب نضج آراء فقهی و قضائی متهافت است. این نوشتار با روش توصیفی- تحلیلی و بررسی اقوال فقهی- حقوقی و رویه‌‌ی قضائی با تاکید بر رای هیات عمومی شعب کیفری دیوانعالی کشور این فرضیه را اثبات می‌‌نماید که نوع زنا با وعده‌‌ی ازدواج می تواند نسبت به زانی از جنبه‌‌ی الهی زنا مطاوعی و نسبت به مزنی بها از جنبه‌‌ی حق الناسی مصداق زنای بدون رضایت واقعی قلمداد گردد. چه آنکه تمایز ادله‌‌ی اثبات دعوا از دو جنبه‌‌ی اللهی و مردمی مقتضی آن است که همان گونه که صرف شبهه در زنای به عنف از جنبه‌‌ی حق اللهی موجب سقوط حد قتل از زانی می‌‌شود، شبهه در رضایت مزنی بها از جنبه‌‌ی حق الناسی، زانی را ضامن مهرالمثل و ارش البکاره یا خسارت معنوی مزنی بها سازد.

civil and criminal liability for sexual intercourse with a promise of marriage: emphasizing the verdict of the general assembly of the criminal branches of the supreme court

rape and consensual sexual intercourse are governed by distinct situational and obligatory rulings. the distinction between these two is particularly significant when considering the divine and human rights aspects. rape involves a violation of both divine and human rights, while obedient sexual intercourse is primarily governed by divine principles. this fundamental difference necessitates a differential approach, focusing on protecting the victim in cases of rape. one of the legal challenges arising in this context is the classification of sexual intercourse with a promise of marriage, and the subsequent civil and criminal liabilities resulting from it. this issue has led to various jurisprudential viewpoints and judicial decisions.some of the key challenges related to this issue include: first, whether sexual intercourse with a promise of marriage should be recognized as adultery from a divine perspective when it involves the woman’s consent, and as adultery from a human rights perspective when it occurs without the woman’s consent. in this case, the adulterer would be held responsible for paying the dowry (mahr al-mesl) and compensation for virginity (arsh al-bekareh) to the victimized woman. second, whether repeated sexual intercourse with the promise of marriage would absolve the adulterer from the responsibility of paying the dowry and compensation for virginity, especially after the first instance of rape. third, whether real non-consent is only attributed to minors and those who are insane. fourth, whether ignorance of the nature and illegitimacy of adultery by adults can be considered as non-consent. finally, whether there is a legal justification for imposing responsibility for moral damage compensation due to adultery with a promise of marriage.this paper, employing a descriptive-analytical method and examining jurisprudential-legal theories and judicial procedures, argues that sexual intercourse with a promise of marriage can have different legal classifications depending on the perspective of the parties involved. the distinction between divine and human rights necessitates that, just as doubt about the divine aspect of rape may lead to exemption from the death penalty, ambiguity surrounding the victim’s consent in the human rights context obligates the rapist to pay conventional dowry (mahr al-mesl) and virginity compensation (arsh al-bekareh).for the deterrence and prevention of adultery, it is essential to uphold the principle that the adulterer is responsible for paying the dowry and virginity compensation to the victim of adultery committed under the guise of a marriage promise. in addition to the potential physical harm, such as the loss of the hymen, adultery causes significant loss of dignity and spiritual credibility for the victim. the islamic penal code of 2013 remains silent on the issue of moral damages compensation in addition to the dowry.