a comparative study on anonymizing networks: tor, i2p, and riffle networks comparison

Background and objectives: among miscellaneous networks, onion-based routing network technologies such as the onion-based routing (tor), invisible internet project (i2p), and riffle networks are used to communicate anonymously by different worldwide users for security, privacy, and safety requirements. sometimes, these types of networks sacrifice anonymity for the sake of efficient communication or vice-versa. this paper surveys aforementioned networks for investigating their potential and challenges. methods: onion-routing networks encapsulate messages in several layers of encryption similar to layers of an onion. the anonymous communication networks are involved dining cryptographers (dc) problem so-called dc-nets, which need sending anonymous message with unconditional sender and untraceable receipt. so, dc-nets must be resistant against traffic analysis attacks although they will attenuate the network bandwidth. in this line, tor is a free software that provides anonymous communication, i2p networks are based on hidden internet service project which uses tunnelling for anonymous communications, and riffle networks include a small set of camouflaging servers that provide anonymity for authorized users. this paper presents a comparative study on anonymizing tor, i2p, and riffle networks in terms of associated prominent parameters in this vein. results: the comparison is based on similarities, differences, and challenges in network behaviors. this comparison is beneficial for further researches and future improvements. conclusion: the review of the current paper reveals that the riffle networks are more resilient and have great confidentiality and integrity against other onion-based routing networks.