Deception in multi-attacker security game with nonfuzzy and fuzzy payoffs

There is significant interest in studying security games for defense optimizationand reducing the effects of attacks on various security systemsinvolving vital infrastructures, financial systems, security, and urban safeguardingcenters. game theory can be used as a mathematical tool tomaximize the efficiency of limited security resources. in a game, playersare smart, and it is natural for each player (defender or attacker) to tryto deceive the opponent using various strategies in order to increase hispayoff. defenders can use deception as an effective means of enhancingsecurity protection by giving incorrect information, hiding specific securityresources, or using fake resources. however, despite the importance of deceptionin security issues, there is no considerable research on this field,and most of the works focus on deception in cyber environments. in thispaper, a mixed-integer linear programming problem is proposed to allocateforces efficiently in a security game with multiple attackers using game theoryanalysis. the important subjects of information are their credibilityand reliability. especially when the defender uses deceptive defense forces,there are more ambiguity and uncertainty. security game with z-numberpayoffs is considered to apply both ambiguities in the payoffs and the reliability of earning these payoffs. finally, the proposed method is illustratedby some numerical examples.