بررسی انتقادی تجرد حافظه در فلسفه‌ی صدرایی

می‌دانیم فلسفه‌ی صدرایی حافظه را مجرد و غیرمادی به‌شمار می‌آورد و از این جهت در برابر فلسفه‌های پیش از خود و نیز دانش‌های امروزی قرار می‌گیرد. در این نوشتار درصددیم به‌نوعی به داوری میان این دو دیدگاه مخالف بپردازیم. بدین منظور نخست به گزارش‌ ادله‌ی فلسفه‌ی صدرایی پیرامون تجرد حافظه می‌پردازیم – خواه در فلسفه‌ی خود صدرا خواه در فلسفه‌ی شارحان او. پس از گزارش ادله‌ی تجرد حافظه، نشان خواهیم داد دیدگاه علمی رایج در مورد حافظه و چگونگی بقای صورت‌های حسی و خیالی بر تجرد صدرایی ترجیح فراوان دارد و پذیرفتنی‌تر است. پس با پیش‌نهادن یک تبیین مادی ساده‌ی بدیل به نقد ادله‌ی پیروان فلسفه‌ی صدرایی در این زمینه پرداخته و مغالطه‌های آن ادله را نشان‌ خواهیم داد. هم‌چنین نشان‌ خواهیم داد که اشکال خطای حافظه اشکالی است که حافظه‌ی مجرد و حضوری بودن یادآوری را به‌جد به‌چالش‌می‌کشد. در پایان خواهیم دید خود صدرا و برخی از شارحان او نیز همواره به لوازم تجرد این امور پای‌بند نمانده‌اند. بدین‌سان به روش عقلی و با ابزارهای منطقی دیدگاه‌ها را تحلیل کرده و سنجیده‌ایم و هر از گاهی به دستاوردهای دانش‌های امروزی نیز استناد کرده‌ایم.

a critical study of the immateriality of memory in ṣadrīan philosophy

introductionṣadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. on this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. they remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. remembrance or recollection is to give attention to and recognize the very same initial forms. in this way, when it comes to memory, ṣadrīan philosophy fundamentally diverges from its predecessors as well as modern sciences. because, these modern sciences do not see the need to assume the immateriality of memory. they often suggest that information is stored in the material brain through a kind of encoding, attributing the constancy of memory to the constancy of genetic and neuronal encoding.in this article, i adjudicate these opposing views. to do so, i overview arguments presented for the immateriality of memory both in ṣadrā’s own works and those of his commentators. i then show that, pace ṣadrīan philosophy, materialism about memory is more plausible than the immateriality view. i propose a simple materialistic explanation as an alternative—i.e. an explanation in terms of a distinction between the epistemic mind and the non-epistemic brain memory—to criticize ṣadrīan arguments and unveil their fallacies.methodin this research, i analyze and then appraise the relevant views by drawing on a philosophical method and logical tools. on occasion, we cite the achievements of modern sciences as well.discussionfor ṣadrā, sensory and imaginary perceptions are immaterial. these immaterial forms are identically retained in memory, and then the same identical immaterial forms are recollected. in his discussion of the “traversing movement” (al-ḥarakat al-qaṭʿiyyah), he makes it explicit that the mind, unlike the changing physical external world, has the following characteristic: whatever occurs moment by moment in it remains the same and in an instantaneous, rather than gradual, way. ṣadrīans hold that when, say, a lunar eclipse happens, a form is present to me, and when the eclipse ends, another epistemic form is created in me, while the first form still remains in my mind. in this way, the initial form does not go away, but rather a new form is added. another argument presented by ṣadrīans is that, when dying, people “instantaneously” remember everything they perceived throughout their lives. moreover, memory is characteristically recognitional; that is, it involves the recognition that the remembered thing is identical to what was initially perceived.