مطالعه تاثیر اجرای قانون بورس اوراق بهادار تهران بر رفتار تحلیل‏ گران مالی (مطالعه موردی: شرکت‏های عضو گروه صنعت سرمایه‏گذاری پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران)

هدف از تغییر قوانین بازار سرمایه ایجاد انگیزه‏های بیشتر برای سرمایه‏گذاران بالقوه و بالفعل است. در کشورهای در حال توسعه همچون ایران به منظور شفاف‏سازی اطلاعات مالی و فرهنگ‏سازی سرمایه‏گذاری در بورس اوراق بهادار، تدوین قوانین و مقررات الزام‏کننده افشاء اطلاعات مالی شفاف، از الزامات است. ضرورت تدوین قوانین و مقررات مرتبط با بورس اوراق بهادار حمایت از حقوق سرمایه‏گذاران، ساماندهی و حفظ و توسعه بازار سرمایه است. هدف از انجام این پژوهش، شناخت نقش قوانین و مقررات حاکم بر بورس اوراق بهادار تهران (قانون بازار اوراق بهادار مصوب، 2005) بر رفتار تحلیل‏گری تحلیل‏گران مالی است. در این پژوهش به مطالعه تحلیلی رفتار تحلیل‏گران مالی در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران در طی دو بازه زمانی 2000 الی 2005(قبل از تصویب قانون بازار اوراق بهادار سال 2005) و سال‏های 2006 الی 2011 (بعد از تصویب قانون بازار اوراق بهادار سال 2005) پرداخته شده است. به همین دلیل، رفتار تحلیل‏گران مالی بر مبنای خطای پیش‏بینی، پراکندگی پیش‏بینی و تعداد پیش‏بینی مورد مطالعه قرار گرفته است. شرکت‏های مورد مطالعه در این پژوهش را شرکت‏های عضو گروه صنعت سرمایه‏گذاری پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران در برگرفته و اطلاعات مربوط به متغیرهای پژوهش با استفاده از تحلیل رگرسیون چند متغیره پانلی و پولی، مورد تجزیه و تحلیل قرار گرفته است. نتایج حاصل از پژوهش بیانگر این است که، تفاوت معناداری در خطای پیش‏بینی سود وجود ندارد که این می‏تواند نشانگر شرایط خاص اقتصادی و سیاسی حاکم بر کشور در جهت ایجاد ابهام در محیط اطلاعاتی و عدم اطمینان محیط کسب و کار باشد. این قانون توانسته است که بر پراکندگی پیش‏بینی تحلیل‏گران اثر مثبت داشته که این امر نشان دهنده ابهام در محیط اطلاعاتی تحلیل‏گران است. تعداد پیش‏بینی تحلیل‏گران هیچ تفاوت معناداری نسبت به اجرای این قانون نداشته، دلیل آن می‌تواند ابلاغ مقررات افشای فوری اطلاعات در سال 2001 توسط شورای بورس باشد که تعداد پیش‏بینی را تحت تاثیر قرار داده است. در نتیجه، بعد از تصویب قانون بورس اوراق بهادار سال 2005 رفتار تحلیل‏گران از لحاظ پراکندگی پیش‏بینی، تحت تاثیر قرار گرفته است.

A Study of How Tehran Stock Exchange Law Implementation Affects the Behavior of Financial Analysts:( a case study of member companies of the investment industry group accepted into Tehran Stock Exchange)

The purpose of changing laws in the capital market is to encourage potential and actual investors. In developing countries such as Iran, it has become mandatory to codify revelatory laws and regulations as to clear financial information in order to help increase transparency of these pieces of information and create a culture of investment in the Stock Exchange. Codifying laws and regulations related to the stock exchange is a necessity to protect the rights of investors and organize, maintain, and develop the capital market. Stock Exchange Act (ratified in 2005) is a legal act, consisting of sixty clauses and nine subsections, which aims to organize, maintain, and develop a transparent, fair, and efficient securities market passed by Islamic Consultative Assembly on 22 November 2005, effective as from four months later. The term ‘Fair Market’ signifies that all market participants should be able to act under the same rules and conditions, so no continuous and excessive inequality as to access to information, access to the market, and no order fulfilment priority will be caused. This research aims to recognize the effects of laws and regulations governing Tehran Stock Exchange (Stock Exchange Act ratified in 2005) on the analytical behavior of financial analysts. This research covers the analytical behavior of financial analysts in Tehran Stock Exchange during the following periods: 2000 to 2005 (before the ratification of 2005 Stock Exchange Act) and 2006 to 2011 (after the ratification of 2005 Stock Exchange Act). That’s why the behavior of financial analysts is studied according to Forecast error, Forecast dispersion, and Forecast number. Member companies of the investment industry group accepted into Tehran Stock Exchange constitute the subjects of this research. The required information of companies was gathered from the databases of Tadbirpardaz, Rahavard Novin, and the official website of Securities and Exchange Organization of Iran. Afterwards, these pieces of information were summarized and estimated in Excel, ready to be analyzed, and variables of interest in this research were calculated and underwent the final analysis via the following statistical software: Eviews and Minitab. The reliability level used to test the hypotheses and examine the assumptions of the classical regression is 95 percent. To test the hypotheses, the regression analysis was used, and to choose among the panel and integrated data (pooling) FLimmer test was utilized. Based on FLimmer test, the panel data was selected to test the first and third hypotheses, and the integrated data (pooling) was selected to test the second hypothesis. In order to determine the type of panel data (random and fixed effects) in the first and third hypotheses, the Hausman test was used in a way that the first hypothesis was tested via panel regression with random effects, and the third hypothesis, via the panel regression with fixed effects. The Jarquebera test and coxbox transformations were utilized to check the normality of the data. The controlled variables of the current study, controlled in accordance with the evidence about their influence on the dependent variables, are as follows: 1. Company Size (Size), 2. Return of Assets (RoA), 3. Systematic Beta Risk (Bet), 4. Financial Leverage (TDTA), and 5. Altman Zscore (AltZ) The results show that the implementation/execution variable of Exchange Act (Z) does not affect the analysts ' forecast error (FE), because the significance level for this variable is %47, which is more than %05 error level. The implementation/execution variable of Exchange Act (Z) affects the analysts’ forecast dispersion (FD), because the significance level for this variable is %0133, which is less than %05 error level. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient for variable of Securities Exchange Act (Z) is positive. The number of financial analysts’ forecasts is not affected by the Exchange Act, because the significance level for this variable is %0896, which is more than %05 error level. The results of this research show that there is no significant differences in Forecast error of earnings which, in turn, signifies special economic and political conditions governing the country in order to obscure the information and create a climate of mistrust in the business environment. This law has been able to affect Forecast dispersion positively, which reflects the existence of obscurity in the information available to the analysts. It is recommended to investors in Iran Capital Market (especially the newcomers) to invest more cautiously; due to the uncertainty in the market, they had better invest in investment funds and companies, and use the of analysts ' forecast dispersion as a criterion to invest in the capital market. The Forecast number of analysts shows no significant differences as to the implementation of this law; it can be put down to the notification of Fast Revelation of Information Regulation (2001) by the Stock Exchange Supervisory Council affecting the Forecast number. As a result, the behavior of analysts has been influenced in terms of Forecast dispersion after the ratification of the Stock Exchange Act in 2005.