بررسی راهکارهای مقابله با مشکل رایگان‌سواری و رانت‌جویی در تعیین حق‌الزحمه و پاداش مدیران شرکت‌های سهامی

استفاده از نهاد نمایندگی در اداره حقوق شرکت‌های تجاری ناگزیر است و این نهاد هزینه ‌هایی را درپی دارد. یکی از هزینه ‌های نمایندگی در مدیریت شرکت‌های تجاری رانت جویی و سواری مجانی است که در سازوکار تعیین حق‌الزحمه و پاداش مدیران ایجاد می شود. در این خصوص پرسش این است که چگونه حق‌الزحمه و پاداش مدیران تعیین شود که مدیر در راستای بیشینه ‌سازی ثروت شرکت حرکت کند و به رایگان سواری و رانت جوی روی نیاورد.در فرض تعیین مبلغ ثابت به‌عنوان حق‌ الزحمه مدیر، مشکل سواری مجانی و در حالت مبلغ نامعین یا مبتنی بر عملکرد مشکل رانت   جویی ایجاد می شود. برای حل این مشکلات و در جهت افزایش هزینه ‌های رانت ‌جویی و رایگان ‌سواری باید بخشی از حق‌ الزحمه را به صورت معین و بخشی را بر مبنای عملکرد تعیین کرد. در کنار این اقدام تقویت سیستم نظارتی جهت استفاده از ابزار عزل مدیران و مسوولیت مدنی و کیفری ضروری است. در حقوق شرکت‌های سهامی ایران به رغم اینکه به همین روش عمل شده است اما به دلیل اینکه پاداش بخشی از حق‌الزحمه نیست و نیز ضعف سیستم نظارتی، عدم تمایز بین عملکرد مدیران و ایجابی نبودن وظایف مدیران مشکلات رایگان سواری و رانت جویی برقرار است.

solving the problems of free-riding and rent-seeking in determining the directors fee and reward of joint-stock companies

companies, as legal entity, are inherently artificial constructs. they lack consciousness, intentionality, or physical form. consequently, they are entirely dependent on natural persons to articulate their will, execute decisions, and interact with the real world. this conceptual foundation lies at the heart of corporate legal theory, which treats legal persons as fictional subjects established for functional and economic purposes. unlike naturalpersons, companies are abstract entities that cannot independently act or think. to overcome this ontologicalvoid, legal systems have historically entrusted natural persons—most notably, the board of directors—to serve as the operational organs of the company: its mind, voice, and hands.however, this delegation of corporate agency to natural persons generates an intrinsic tension. the board of directors, while formally tasked with promoting the best interests of the company, comprises individuals with personal motivations, distinct values, and self-interested goals. the legal doctrine often portrays the board andthe company as a single, coherent unit—a concept championed in theories such as roknit’s notion of organizational personhood—but economic and behavioral sciences reveal a stark divergence: individuals vested with corporate authority often behave in ways that maximize personal utility rather than collective value.this divergence is especially problematic in the context of directors’ remuneration. the board of directors isinherently a collective organ—typically composed of three or more members in private companies and five or more in public companies, as stipulated by many national corporate laws. despite representing a unitary legal actor, the board consists of individuals with diverse incentives and varying degrees of influence. some legal regimes even permit legal persons to serve as directors, contingent upon the appointment of a permanent natural representative. this additional layer of representation further complicates the already tenuous relationship between the company’s legal fiction and its decision-making apparatus.designing an equitable and effective compensation structure for directors is, therefore, a particularly delicate challenge. fixed-fee remuneration can give rise to free-riding, wherein certain directors perform minimal dutieswhile receiving the same compensation as more active or competent peers. conversely, performance-based pay may trigger rent-seeking behavior, whereby directors exploit short-term metrics or asymmetrical information to inflate personal compensation without creating commensurate value for the company. neither extreme adequately addresses the underlying agency dilemma.