beyond the mainstream: ostrom's polycentric governance as a pragmatist–institutionalist synthesis

The dominant narrative in economics, shaped by the tragedy of the commons, prescribes state intervention or privatization as the only solutions to collective action problems. elinor ostrom's work, documenting sustainable common-pool resource governance, poses a profound challenge to this orthodoxy. yet, her theoretical legacy remains contested. this article moves beyond viewing ostrom as an empirical anomaly within mainstream economics, offering instead a heterodox reconstruction of her work as a coherent pragmatist–institutionalist synthesis. we argue that ostrom's method is grounded in charles s. peirce's logic of abduction and fallibilism, while her normative commitments align with john dewey's experimental democracy and experiential learning. situating her within the classical institutionalist tradition (veblen, commons, mitchell) and contrasting her approach with the new institutionalism (williamson, north, coase), we demonstrate that her analysis of polycentric governance represents a distinct paradigm. a comparative re-reading of her canonical case studies—nepalese irrigation, swiss forests, and turkish fisheries—reveals how local knowledge, participatory rule-making, and iterative correction function as mechanisms for reducing transaction costs and building resilient institutions. the article concludes by outlining a robust policy and research agenda for climate, digital, and urban governance, arguing that a pragmatist–institutionalist reading of ostrom provides not merely a corrective, but a viable heterodox alternative to market- and state-centric models, one that prioritizes pluralism, adaptive efficiency, and democratic legitimacy.