expanding the cournot competition model considering sanctions and resource share

One of the most important problems in the exploitation of shared natural resources is the difference in the parties' shares, the energy source, the type of technology used in resource exploitation, ensuring the necessary capital for extraction and field development, and so on. in exploiting shared natural resources, it is not possible to simply rely on the principle of national sovereignty and unilaterally engage in the exploitation of these resources. rational exploitation and joint development can only be effective if the issue of defining boundaries has been resolved. one of the most existing models in the field of exploiting shared natural resources is the cournot competition model, but this model is designed based on simple assumptions. this study applies game theory to modify the classical cournot competition model. a more comprehensive framework is developed by incorporating critical variables specifically, each country's resource share and the impact of sanctions. the results indicate that each country's extraction capacity is directly related to its share of the shared resource and inversely related to the sanction factor. additionally, each country's best response function is not only a function of the level of extraction and total supply (b) and extraction costs but also a function of the interested parties' share of the shared resource and their extraction capacity.