آیا برگسون پدیدارشناس است؟ مطلقِ داده‌شده و تضایف‌اندیشی

انتقاد همیشگی پدیدارشناسان از فلسفۀ برگسون این بوده که او با وجود آفرین‌انگیزی در میانۀ راهِ پدیدارشناسی از پیمودن طریق درست بازمانده و سرانجام در نوعی رئالیسم ساده‌انگارانه متوقف شده است. از سوی دیگر، رئالیست‌ها نیز هرگاه خواسته‌اند فلسفۀ برگسون را نقد کنند آن را نوعی تضایف‌باوری شمرده‌اند که با پدیدارشناسی، نه به صورت ماهوی، بلکه تنها به‌کمابیشی و در درجه تفاوت دارد. رئالیسم و تضایف‌باوری دو سوی متقابل بوده‌اند که فلسفۀ برگسون گاه به این و گاه به آن بازبرده شده است. از این رو، پاسخ به پرسش از این‌که برگسون پدیدارشناس است یا نه ناگزیر باید پاسخ به این پرسش نیز باشد که آیا او، آن‌گونه که پدیدارشناسان می‌انگارند، رئالیست نیز هست یا نه. بدین‌سان، پرسش این نوشته آن است که آیا اندیشۀ برگسون را می‌توان از گونۀ تضایف‌باوری و نوعی پدیدارشناسیِ نارس به شمار آورد یا باید آن را دارای تفاوت ماهوی (نه درجه‌ای) با پدیدارشناسی شمرد؛ و نیز اگر فلسفۀ برگسون را نمی‌توان از گونۀ پدیدارشناسی دانست، آیا ناگزیر باید اندیشۀ او را همنوا با بعضی پدیدارشناسان نوعی رئالیسم خام‌دستانه دانست یا نه. یافتۀ این نوشته آن است که برگسون با اندیشۀ مطلق داده‌شده از این دوگانه درگذشته و هر دو را دربرگرفته است.

is bergson a phenomenologist? the given absolute vs the correlationalism

intoductionconsidering bergson's philosophy from the perspective of phenomenology, in order to compare and evaluate the latter, is a long-standing and seemingly justified approach. indeed, in both thoughts, the duality between subject and object is transcended, the intuition of lived time occupies a central place, data are fundamental in themselves, and temporality constitutes the foundation of consciousness. however, this evaluation, carried out by three generations of phenomenologists (roman ingarden, maurice merleau-ponty, renaud barbaras), is based on the idea that bergson's philosophy represents a kind of early — and, of course, unfinished — phenomenology. from this point of view, bergson's philosophy is perceived as a version of realism that ultimately reduces consciousness to a thing. however, realists such as quentin meillassoux also consider bergson's philosophy as a type of correlational thought, of the same nature as phenomenology. the common hypothesis among all these perspectives is that bergson's philosophy presents a difference of degree compared to phenomenology. we strive to demonstrate the contrary: it differs in nature. materials and methodsin discussing bergson's philosophy as well as that of certain phenomenologists and realists, we focus on the sources and primary literature. from this point of view, we have taken into account the similarities and (false) identities at the level of technical terms and the lexical field of the two philosophies, as well as in the formulations and statements of the problems and positions. however, upon closer examination, we attempt to dissect the profound difference in substance, despite the striking similarity in form. our method, as far as one can speak of it in this context, consists of highlighting the differences in the false mixtures, rather than seeking unity beyond multiplicity. it is evident that this approach is inspired, in its generality and orientation, by bergson's own philosophy.discussion & resultsthe main contribution of this article is to defend the idea that bergson's philosophy, based on the notion of the given absolute, simultaneously surpasses correlational thoughts such as phenomenology and different forms of realism. on one hand, the absoluteness of bergson's duration establishes a clear distinction between bergson's philosophy and any philosophy that thinks under the universal a priori of correlation. on the other hand, the bergsonian réel to which consciousness refers is only the moving, which differs in nature from a reified conception of the real: the thing, in bergson's eyes, is merely an abstraction of the flow of the real, of the real as duration. hence, the impossibility of considering bergson's thought as a regrettable return to the reified conception of the real. in result, realists are not justified to consider bergson's thought as a version of correlationalism, neither phenomenologists are allowed to designate it as a disguised realism. conclusionbergson's philosophy is not limited to a simple difference of degree with phenomenology, but presents a difference of nature. therefore, despite appearances, there is a profound divergence between the notions and fundamental conceptions of the two. the bergsonian given absolute is exempted to be received or to be given to a certain consciousness. consequently, the meaning of donation in bergson's philosophy fundamentally differs from that proposed in phenomenology. in bergson's philosophy, the donation consists of a continuous differentiation of duration, and consciousness itself is merely the product of one of its movements of differentiation. in contrast, donation, according to the understanding of the three phenomenologists mentioned earlier, stemming from husserlian phenomenology, is the establishment of a correlational relationship between the given and the receiver. from this perspective, while for husserl's phenomenology consciousness is always the consciousness of something, for bergson's philosophy, thinking intuitively amounts to thinking in duration. in the same vein, the responses of these two philosophies to the question of experience are also different: one transforms transcendence into immanence, while the other transforms self-consciousness into consciousness of the other. the basis of this difference lies in the two distinct ontologies and logics that underlie each of these philosophies. the logic of phenomenology is based on the fundamental principle of correlation, while the logic of bergson's philosophy is that of expression. what underpins bergson's philosophy, namely duration as the given absolute, cannot be discussed either in correlational thoughts such as phenomenology or in the different versions of realism. it is irreducibly bergsonian.