practical provably-secure authenticated encryption schemes using lattice-based pseudorandom function spring

Lattice-based cryptography has received significant attention from security practitioners in the past decade. it exhibits attractive properties, including being a major postquantum cryptography candidate, enjoying worstcase to averagecase security reductions, and being supported by efficient implementations. in this paper, we propose three practical latticebased authenticated encryption (ae) schemes. these schemes are provably secure assuming hardness of basic lattice problems. the proposed schemes have remarkable motivationsand advantages over widely-used aes as follows. these schemes are alternatives to current conventional and postquantum ae schemes in the postquantum era. moreover, composing the proposed aes with a lattice-based asymmetric key distribution scheme results to a hybrid encryption which depends only on one (type of) security assumption. the implementation of such hybrid encryption can make use of specific optimizations regarding, e.g., code size in software, and gate equivalent or fpga area usage in hardware. that is because the symmetric and asymmetric algorithms have some common primitive computations. to evaluate the performance of the proposed aes, we implement them on current intel cpus and benchmark them to encrypt messages of various sizes. the most efficient proposed scheme is only 12% slower than aes-256-gcm for 40byte messages on sandy bridge, and 34% faster for 1500byte messages.