self, social, or neuraldetermination?

Human “free will” has been made problematic by several recent arguments against mental causation, the unity of the i or “self,” and the possibility that conscious decisionmaking could be temporally prior to action. this paper suggests a pathway through this thicket for free will or selfdetermination. doing so requires an account of mind as an emergent process in the context of animal psychology and mental causation. consciousness, a palpable but theoretically more obscure property of some minds, is likely to derive from complex animals’ realtime monitoring of internal state in relation to environment. following antonio damasio, human mind appears to add to nonhuman “core consciousness” an additional narrative “selfconsciousness.” the neurological argument against free will, most famously from benjamin libet, can be avoided as long as “free will” means, not an impossible event devoid of prior causation, but an occasional causal role played by narrative selfconsciousness in behavioral determination. there is no necessary incompatibility between the scientific and evolutionary exploration of mind and consciousness and the uniquely selfdetermining capabilities of human mentality which are based on the former.

Self, Social, or NeuralDetermination?

Human “free will” has been made problematic by several recent arguments against mental causation, the unity of the I or “self,” and the possibility that conscious decisionmaking could be temporally prior to action. This paper suggests a pathway through this thicket for free will or selfdetermination. Doing so requires an account of mind as an emergent process in the context of animal psychology and mental causation. Consciousness, a palpable but theoretically more obscure property of some minds, is likely to derive from complex animals’ realtime monitoring of internal state in relation to environment. Following Antonio Damasio, human mind appears to add to nonhuman “core consciousness” an additional narrative “selfconsciousness.” The neurological argument against free will, most famously from Benjamin Libet, can be avoided as long as “free will” means, not an impossible event devoid of prior causation, but an occasional causal role played by narrative selfconsciousness in behavioral determination. There is no necessary incompatibility between the scientific and evolutionary exploration of mind and consciousness and the uniquely selfdetermining capabilities of human mentality which are based on the former.