caesarean section versus normal vaginal delivery: a game theory discussion in reimbursement interventions

Background: the rate of caesarean section (c-section) in iran is too high, so having a plan to control it is crucial. since one of the most important reasons for inclination of providers to do c-section is financial issues, the purpose of this study was offering financial solutions for increasing normal vaginal delivery (nvd) and decreasing non-indicated c-section. methods: this analytical-descriptive research, used game theory for offering financial mechanisms. the game was a dynamic one in which the backward induction was used to obtain a nash equilibrium. financial structure and the mean number of nvd and c-section in a certain period of time in comparison with standards were as the main influential factors on financial dimensions and were included in the model. results: the effect of financial structure was shown through a specified insurance for childbirth, existence of a monitoring department and tariffs. conclusion: the main solution for controlling c-section in designed game was taxes and fines for physician or hospital in non- indicated cases and giving reward otherwise.