Empowering small fishermen through simultaneous and sequential marketing strategies

One of the socio-economic issues often discussed in marketing of marine catch of small-scale fishermen is the agent-principal relationship. they become socially obliged to the benefits and assistance provided by credit agents specifically when their credits accumulated. this asymmetric circumstance has empowered the credit agent to gain control over the marketing of fishermen daily catches. another form of marketing strategy that has never been investigated before,at least in the fishing industry,is the way by which fishermen catches are brought to the market place. specifically,we posit those who are dominant in the market will be affected by either simultaneous (collusive and non-collusive) or sequential marketing strategies. drawing on strategic game theory using data from fisheries statistics,this study is aimed at identifying policies for the least advantaged small fishermen to improve their income and thus their livelihood. efficient outcomes which are the net incomes derived from fishing activities of small versus medium,medium versus large and small versus large vessel fishermen were used in the analysis of marketing strategies. evidently,whilst merging is profitable to the small fishermen,sequential with small fishermen as the first mover is also profitable but has more profound impact on the society's welfare. © penerbit umt.