effect of revenue-sharing contracts in the points supply chain of coalition loyalty programs with stochastic advertising-dependent demand

A coalition loyalty program (clp) is a business strategy employed by for-profit companies to increase or retain their customers. one of the operational challenges of these programs is how to choose the mechanism of coordination between business partners. this paper examines the role of revenuesharing contracts in the loyalty points supply chain of clp with stochastic advertising-dependent demand where the program operator (called the host) sells loyalty points to the partners of the program. the purpose of this study is to examine the effect of this coordination mechanism on the decisions and profits of the members of the chain using the stackelberg game method and determine whether the presence of revenue-sharing contracts benefits the chain members when the advertising is done by the host and when the advertising cost is shared between the host and its partners. the results show that when the host gives bonus points to end customers (advertising), revenue-sharing contracts become a powerful incentive for the profitability of the host and its partners. the findings provide new insights into the management of clps, which can benefit business decision-makers.