Changes in a Service Oriented Enterprise: A Game Theory Approach

Service oriented enterprises (soes) are subject to constant changeand variation. in this paper, the changes are considered from aneconomic perspective based on service culture notion. once a changeis implemented, the costs of some member services may increase,whereas the costs of some other services may reduce. we construct agame theoretic model trying to capture the possible conflictinginterests of different parties in a soe. three incentive mechanisms areapplied to the model. the first incentive mechanism shares the utilityequally among the services involved in the change; the second utilitysharingrule is based on the nash’s bargaining solution, whichaccommodates the possible biased interdependencies inside thenetwork; and the third rule, based on the harsanyi’s modified shapleyvalue, takes into account the possible coalition formation among thenetwork parties. since the three rules are analytically solvable, theprinciples of utility sharing can be implemented, for instance, as exantecontracts.