تاثیر بیش‌اعتمادی مدیران بر تغییر طبقه‌بندی هزینه‌ها: نقش تعدیلگر قابلیت مقایسۀ صورت‌های مالی

تغییر طبقه‌بندی هزینه‌ها به طرزی جالب توجه کیفیت سود عملیاتی را به خطر می‌اندازد و به اطلاعات گمراه‌کننده دربارۀ عملکرد اصلی و پایدار شرکت‌ها منجر می‌شود. تغییر طبقه‌بندی ممکن است پیامد مستقیم و غیرعمدی سوگیری شناختی مدیران با اعتمادبه‌نفس زیاد باشد. همچنین، مدیران با اعتمادبه‌نفس زیاد ممکن است آگاهانه و عمداً هزینه‌های عملیاتی را به ‌عنوان اقلام غیرعملیاتی طبقه‌بندی کنند تا سودهای عملیاتی را افزایش دهند؛ با این‌ حال، اگر صورت‌های مالی شرکت‌ها با همتایان آن‌ها در صنعت مقایسه شوند، نظارت قوی‌تر به فرصت‌های کمتر برای مدیریت سود ناشی از تغییر طبقه‌بندی منجر می‌شود. هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی تاثیر بیش‌اعتمادی مدیران بر تغییر طبقه‌بندی هزینه‌ها بر اساس نقش تعدیلگر قابلیت مقایسۀ صورت‌های مالی است. نمونۀ آماری شامل 130 شرکت در بازۀ زمانی 1394 تا 1401 است. به ‌منظور آزمون فرضیه‌ها از مدل رگرسیون چندمتغیره و داده‌های ترکیبی (با کنترل اثرات سال و صنعت) و نرم‌افزار ایویوز نسخۀ 9 استفاده شده است. نتایج نشان داد بیش‌اعتمادی مدیران به افزایش تغییر طبقه‌بندی هزینه‌ها و کاهش تدریجی تغییر طبقه‌بندی در طول زمان منجر می‌شود. علاوه بر این، قابلیت مقایسۀ صورت‌های مالی همانند یک مانع برای بیش‌اعتمادی مدیران در جهت تغییر طبقه‌بندی هزینه‌ها و تدریج کاهشی تغییر طبقه‌بندی در طول زمان عمل می‌کند؛ بنابراین، ذی‌نفعان بازار سرمایه باید به بیش‌اعتمادی مدیران و قابلیت مقایسۀ صورت‌های مالی در راستای تغییر طبقه‌بندی هزینه‌ها توجه جدی داشته باشند.

the impact of managerial overconfidence on expenses classification shifting: the moderating role of comparability of financial statements

abstract expenses classification shifting significantly compromises the quality of core earnings, resulting in misleading information about firms’ core and sustainable performance. classification shifting can be a direct and unintentional consequence of overconfident ceos’ cognitive bias. also, overconfident ceos might consciously and intentionally misclassify recurring expenses as nonrecurring items to inflate core earnings; however, if the firms’ financial statements are more comparable to those of their industry peers, stronger monitoring leads to fewer opportunities to manage earnings. the purpose of the present study is to investigate the impact of managerial overconfidence on expense classification shifting based on the moderating role of the comparability of financial statements. the sample consists of 130 companies in the period 2015-2022. the results showed that managers’ overconfidence leads to increased expense classification shifting and a piecemeal decrease in classification shifting over time.  in addition, the comparability of financial statements is an obstacle to managers’ overconfidence in expense classification shifting and their piecemeal reduction over time. therefore, the market participants should pay serious attention to the overconfident ceos’ and the comparability of financial statements to expense classification shifting. key words: expenses classification shifting, managerial overconfidence, comparability of financial statements. introductiona stream of research shows that managers purposely classify essentially persistent expenses in the special items category and engage in classification shifting. classification shifting differs from accruals and real earnings management in that it is a less costly earnings management tool that inflates the core performance of the firm and misleads investors about the firm’s sustainable core profitability. prior studies on classification shifting focus mainly on firm-level factors and little is known about whether executive attributes are associated with firms’ propensity to engage in classification shifting. our study fills this void by investigating whether and how an important individual characteristic, ceo overconfidence, is associated with classification shifting. in this regard, considering the opportunities for earnings manipulation, the comparability of financial statements may also play a role in the relationship of managerial overconfidence and expenses classification shifting. also, this research adds to the body of literature probing the financial reporting quality of firms with overconfident managers. methods & materialthe statistical population in this research is all the companies listed on tehran stock exchange and the period under investigation is from 2015 to 2022. in this research, the systematic elimination method was used to reach the sample, and 130 companies were selected as the research sample. the research model is estimated through panel data by controlling the effects of industry and year by ordinary least squares method with robust standard error. findingthe findings of the first hypothesis show that managers’ overconfidence leads to an increase in expense classification shifting and a piecemeal decrease in classification shifting over time. in addition, the findings of the second hypothesis show that the comparability of financial statements is an obstacle to managers’ overconfidence in expense classification shifting and their piecemeal reduction over time. conclusion & resultsin this study, the association between an important behavioral attribute of ceos, managerial overconfidence, and the occurrence of classification shifting has been investigated. the findings showed that managerial overconfidence is related to an increase in unexpected core earnings via reclassifying recurring expenses to special items and that the association between managerial overconfidence and classification shifting is more evident for firms whose financial statements are more comparable with their peers in the industry because stronger monitoring leads to fewer opportunities to manage earnings.  the evidence shows that increased financial comparability can mitigate the effects of managerial overconfidence on classification shifting. together, these results suggest that overconfident ceos intentionally engage in classification shifting and inflate core earnings, and this relation is more pronounced when ceos have strong incentives and more opportunities to engage in misconduct. this study provides evidence that an important managerial attribute of ceos, overconfidence, plays a significant role in explaining firms’ practice of classification shifting, and that classification shifting conducted by overconfident ceos is driven by intended actions rather than unintentional behavior. thus, the results suggest that regulators should also pay attention to the practice of classification shifting, considering the management style of ceos.