واکنش سهامداران به افشای محتوای اطلاعات چارچوب گزارشگری یکپارچه در شرایط تضاد منافع

در مطالعه حاضر، واکنش سهامداران به افشای محتوای اطلاعات چارچوب گزارشگری یکپارچه در شرایط تضاد منافع ازطریق تعدیل بازده مورد انتظار بررسی شده است. بازده مورد انتظار سهامداران با بهره‌گیری از مدل قیمت‌گذاری دارایی‌های سرمایه‌ای محاسبه شده است. هزینه نمایندگی ناشی از تضاد منافع براساس مفهوم کارایی طبق نسبت هزینه‌های عملیاتی به درآمدهای عملیاتی فروش محاسبه شده است. به‌‌علاوه، شاخص افشای اطلاعات عناصر محتوا در چارچوب گزارشگری یکپارچه براساس چک‌لیستی از ابعاد مربوطه سنجش شده است. برای انجام تحلیل‌ها، تعداد 144 شرکت طی سال‌های 1395 تا 1401 طبق روش غربالگری از جامعه آماری شرکت‌های پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران گزینش شدند. داده‌های بررسی‌شده بر مبنای مشاهده‌های شرکت-سال هستند که با تمرکز بر داده‌های پس‌رویدادی، از مدل‌های رگرسیونی در تحلیل‌ها استفاده شده است. شواهد نشان دادند هزینه‌‌ نمایندگی ناشی از تضاد منافع بین مدیران و مالکان سبب می‌شود سهامداران بازده مورد انتظار بالاتری مطالبه کنند؛ با این حال، تلاش شرکت‌ها در افشای اطلاعات مربوط به عناصر محتوا چارچوب گزارشگری یکپارچه سبب تعدیل بازده مورد انتظار سهامداران هنگام بروز تضاد نمایندگی می‌شود و از این رو، بازده مورد انتظار سهامداران کاهش می‌یابد. این یافته‌ها سازگار با مبانی استدلالی نظریه علامت‌دهی است که طبق آن گرچه افزایش تضادهای نمایندگی علامتی هشداردهنده برای شرکت‌ها مبنی بر مطالبه بازده بالاتر از سوی سهامداران است، تمرکز شرکت‌ها بر بهبود جنبه‌های افشای اطلاعات براساس عناصر محتوا در چارچوب گزارشگری یکپارچه به‌عنوان علامتی مثبت از سوی سهامداران تلقی می‌شود که می‌تواند انتظارات بازدهی آنها را تعدیل کند.

shareholders’ reaction to information content disclosure of the integrated reporting framework under interest conflicts

the present study is assessed the shareholders’ reaction to information content disclosure of the integrated reporting framework under the interest conflicts through the channel of expected return adjustment. the shareholders’ expected return is derived from the capital assets pricing model. the interest conflict caused by agency problems has been measured using the operating expenses to operating revenues ratio as a proxy of agency cost. in addition, the information disclosure index corresponding to the content elements under integrated reporting framework has been measured based on a relevant dimensions checklist. the research population includes 144 firms listed in the tehran securities & exchange during march 2016 till march 2023. the multivariable panel regression models based on firm-year observations focusing on post-event data were used to test research hypotheses. the evidences showed that the agency cost arising from interest conflict between managers and owners causes shareholders to demand higher expected returns. however, firms’ effort to disclose information related to content elements of the integrated reporting framework will moderate the shareholders’ expected returns when agency conflicts occur; hence, the shareholders’ expected return decreases. these findings are consistent with the signaling theory, according to which, although the increase in agency conflicts is a warning sign for firms to demand higher returns from shareholders, but firms’ efforts to improve information disclosure aspects based on content elements in the integrated reporting framework is a positive sign, meaning that shareholders can adjust their return expectations. introductionin recent years, achieving high-quality disclosure has focused on the integration of financial and non-financial information under an integrated reporting approach. considering the role of integrated reporting in improving the content of information disclosure, it is important to assess its consequences in the capital market. it is expected that following the integrated framework as a new reporting approach will create better reports for stakeholders and improve transparency and accountability in the capital market. since introducing the integrated reporting framework, countries have shown a greater willingness to follow this reporting approach. however, due to the lack of acceptance and full implementation of this approach in recent years in iran, only the movement towards an integrated reporting framework can be explored. although there is some empirical evidence about the improving information environment with a focus on new reporting approaches, the effect of content elements disclosure according to the integrated reporting framework on the shareholders’ expectations in achieving returns has not been addressed, especially under agency problem risk between providers and users of information. to cover this research gap, the present study has assessed the role of information disclosure following the integrated reporting framework in adjusting the shareholders’ expected return considering the occurrence of interest conflict risk. in this regard, first, the effect of agency cost arising from interest conflicts on shareholders’ expected return has been analyzed, and then, the impact of information disclosure related to content elements moving towards the integrated reporting framework on the shareholders’ expected return under agency conflict circumstances has been assessed. methods & materialthe shareholders’ expected return is derived from the capital assets pricing model. the interest conflict caused by agency problems has been measured using the ratio of operating expenses to operating revenues as a proxy of agency cost. in addition, the information disclosure index corresponding to the content elements under the integrated reporting framework has been measured based on a relevant dimensions checklist. the research population includes 144 firms listed in the tehran securities & exchange from march 2016 to march 2023. the multivariable panel regression models based on firm-year observations focusing on post-event data were used to test research hypotheses.findingsthe evidence showed that the agency cost arising from interest conflict between managers and owners causes shareholders to demand higher expected returns. the occurrence of agency conflicts is perceived as a risk criterion by shareholders and leads to an increase in the shareholders’ expected returns. however, firms’ efforts to disclose information related to content elements based on the integrated reporting framework will moderate the shareholders’ expected returns when agency conflicts occur. it means that following the information disclosure procedure according to the integrated reporting framework has restricted the agency problems risk, and led to a reduction in the shareholders’ expected return under the occurrence of the interest conflict by improving the information environment and reducing information asymmetry. conclusioneven though shareholders expect to achieve higher returns under agency conflict occurrence, improving the information disclosure level and controlling the agency conflict risk by moving towards integrated reporting causes shareholders to adjust their expectations about returns. hence, the shareholders’ expected return decreases. these findings are consistent with the signaling theory, according to which, although the increase in agency conflicts is a warning sign for firms to demand higher returns from shareholders, firms’ efforts to improve information disclosure aspects based on content elements in the integrated reporting framework is a positive sign, meaning that shareholders can adjust their return expectations.